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Modern day commercial clouds are subject to various forms of infrastructu-
ral abuse. Whether it is SaaS, PaaS or IaaS model, attackers and cybercrimi-
nals are exploiting clouds to service their needs and using them as a platform to
launch attacks and conduct illegal practices. Resultantly, instances where clouds
are the source of a malicious or damaging activity have recently spiked. Unlike
externally-sourced attacks on clouds, abuse arising from ’within’ presents new
challenges. This thesis highlights the emerging problem of cloud abuse and at-
tempts to address these challenges.
In particular, we argue for a new approach to cloud security that mitigates abuse
proactively before the damage is done. Current defense mechanisms are ill-suited
as they are primarily designed to mitigate incoming attacks, where the cloud is
the target of the attack. Outbound traffic and resource usage is seldom scrutinized
for malicious and illegal activities. Furthermore, in-VM security software, such
as anti-viruses and intrusion detection systems fail to provide adequate protection
as they can be bypassed (using polymorphism, stealth etc.), hidden from (as in
virtualization-aware rootkits) or altogether turned off (by getting root access).
To make matters worse, hackers have invented automated mechanisms that ex-
ploit the freemium business model, allowing them to engineer large pools of re-
sources by combining together the free tier supply. Potentially infinite storage
banks and cryptocurrency mining farms with huge distributed footprints have been
exposed on top of complimentary services offered by various Cloud Service Pro-
viders (CSPs). This has incentivized hackers further, as they can launch lucrative
attacks, such as DDoS attacks and spamming, free of cost.
Providers struggle to detect this abuse as they lack the necessary tools and in-
frastructure for proactive detection and mitigation. Currently, all parties (users
and providers) are made aware of the abuse when the damage has already been
done and different losses have been incurred either by the user or, as in most ca-
ses, the provider. These issues highlight the need for new security mechanisms
specifically designed to target attacks originating from within the cloud.
Hence, in this thesis, we present the design and implementation of an infra-
structure that can prove to be useful in proactively thwarting a diverse range of
cloud abuse. From break-ins and cryptocurrency mining to DDoS attacks and
covert/side channels, the presented infrastructure has the potential to mitigate ma-
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licious activity across the spectrum with high accuracy and low overheads without
compromising scalability or modularity. We argue that clouds need systems that
can react to various forms of abuse by deploying VM-oblivious defenses and mi-
nimize co-residency between tenants by making deployments more mobile. Spe-
cifically, we present the design of monitors leveraging the lower layers of the
cloud-stack, such as the hardware and hypervisor. Furthermore, we also provide
meaningful strategies to dynamically reposition entire deployments to minimize
the sharing of infrastructure between co-resident tenants. The systems discus-
sed herein add to the security toolbox available to providers and assist them in
detecting and mitigating resource abuse in its early stages.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Since their inception, clouds have seized the spotlight as a revolutionary techno-
logy primarily due to the sheer volume of resources they offer. What was pre-
viously thought to be computationally implausible is now commonplace in the
clouds as one can throw “limitless” amounts of compute, memory, storage etc.
at any problem. Furthermore, to cater to the evolving nature of workloads, ven-
dors continue to add diverse and state-of-the-art hardware each day to the arsenal
available to clouds making them even more valuable [87, 53, 14]. Indeed, GPUs,
video transcoders, FPGAs etc., are all being offered as a service on clouds today.
In addition to their enormous and diverse expanse, clouds offer convenient
features that greatly facilitate their adoption. Elasticity, fault-tolerance, high-
availability, load balancing etc., are but a few notable attributes that characterize
services offered by commercial clouds today. To top it off, clouds are quite af-
fordable given their pay-per-use model augmented with the fact that vendors rou-
tinely offer customers free-tier resources and an opportunity to bid for resources
that are auctioned off at lower prices. Together, this size, versatility and afforda-
bility, make clouds an indispensable tool for businesses, research and academia
alike.
Unfortunately, the immense size of modern day clouds, which makes them great
also makes them hard to protect and consequently, vulnerable to abuse [75, 50].
With a large perimeter and an intricate interior (numerous middleboxes), clouds
have a sizable attack surface. Traditional defense mechanisms simply cannot scale
to cover the entire expanse and must be spread thin to protect against more fre-
quent vulnerabilities and exploits. As a result, hackers have found numerous entry
points to break into clouds, using either network or host-based infiltration vectors,
causing considerable monetary losses to both vendors and users. From digital cur-
rency mining pools [131, 54, 33] to spam relays [79] and from unlimited storage
banks [92] to illegal file sharing applications [137], hackers are abusing clouds to
great effect [50].
To make matters worse, the diversity of hardware in these datacenters, makes
them even more attractive to particular types of attackers. For instance, hackers
interested in mining for digital currency often attack GPU and high compute in-
stances. Such illegal mining pools are perfect for the cloud scenario given the
abundance of available resources. Similarly, illegal file hosting services [92, 137]
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or data exfiltration attacks [153], tend to favor Storage-as-a-Service providers,
such as Dropbox. Another example is that of hackers inferring sensitive and pri-
vate information of users via covert and side-channels at both the host and network
level. Numerous attacks have been demonstrated in the literature [155, 111, 132]
whereby sharing of resources, such as low-level caches and network switches, le-
ads to information leakage to a third party. Hence, “specialized” hackers have
strong incentives to exploit and abuse the wide spectrum of resources commonly
found in commercial clouds.
Moving forward, we explicitly define cloud abuse for the purposes of this thesis:
Definition: We consider abuse to be any and all forms of misuse of resources,
whether at the host or network. Acting against the commonly agreed upon fair
and acceptable usage policies. This also includes using services and resources
in a manner that harms and goes against the vision and interests of the Cloud
Service Provider (CSP), other customers or the Internet at large in a substantial
way. Below we discuss a few special cases of cloud abuse in more detail:
1.1 GENERIC CLOUD ABUSE
In 2012, attackers exploited a vulnerability found on several VM instances on
Amazon EC2 and launched a cloud-based DDoS attack from the compromised
hosts [55]. Not only did the attack waste valuable outbound bandwidth, it also
caused parts of Amazon’s public IP address range to be blacklisted at various fi-
rewalls which intercepted the attack traffic. Similarly, security researchers from
Trustwave and NetSPI launched a DDoS attack on a client that wanted to check
their defenses in actual attack scenario. The researchers launched a 150 Mb/s
attack for 2 two hours that cost them around 6$ [151]. These and other such in-
stances of clouds being used as an attack tool are on the rise [50, 130, 26, 36, 83]
and in most cases neither the customer nor the CSP had any idea of the abuse.
In fact, a recent report from security firm Solutionary, reported that Amazon is
the largest malware server in the world with OVH (a French cloud provider) and
Google not far behind [6]. Similarly, a study published in 2015 [50] found that
out of 30 million malware samples submitted to the Anubis Detection System [7].
1.08 million connected to at least one IP address inside of Amazon EC2. This just
goes to show how attackers are abusing clouds in various ways and offering attack
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tools as services to paying customers (the so called Crime-as-a-Service, Malware-
as-a-Service, Attack-as-a-Service, Repositories-as-a-Malicious-Service [74]). Si-
milarly, the popular SpyEye malware, whose authors reportedly made millions of
dollars [2], and the Zeus malware both had their command and control modules
hosted on Amazon’s servers [136, 121, 5]. Despite the fact that cloud providers
have strict policies against such cases of abuse, they are still widespread, which
highlights the need for more robust security mechanisms. As of now, vendors
have no choice but to shut down misbehaving instances in the rare case something
malicious is detected. However, this results in an outage for the customer who is
often a victim of VM hijacking and a paying customer.
Another class of abuse in clouds belongs to the category of inter-tenant attacks.
Given that 10% to 40% of the total cloud traffic is inter-tenant, this is a major
concern [114]. The attack traffic in this case never leaves the data center and
originates from a tenant from within, targeting another customer co-hosted in the
same cloud. Typical cases of inter-tenant attacks include SYN floods, ARP floods,
low-rate DoS attacks etc., and have been explored in the context of commercial
clouds, such as Azure [66].
Similarly, researchers recently demonstrated various ways of generating huge
power spikes in a data center (by increasing power consumption in all hosts) that
could cause the circuit brakers to trip resulting in a blackout [160]. Such abuse of
host-resources is carried out by selectively executing workloads across the tenant
deployment on a particular rack driving the total electricity usage to dangerously
high levels. If the rack is not adequately provisioned with backup electricity gene-
rators it could result in the shutdown of all servers on the rack possibly resulting
in data loss and DoS.
1.2 CRYPTOCURRENCY MINING
For most popular cryptocoins, such as BitCoin and LiteCoin, it is not profitable
to mine using one’s own resources unless the mining is carried out using speciali-
zed hardware [24, 89, 12]. However, the exercise can be of value if carried out on
“stolen” resources, such as pools of hijacked VM instances. This has incentivized
hackers [8, 96, 82, 58, 54, 33] to try their luck at mining. As a result, dedicated
mining botnets with huge footprints, infecting machines with mining trojans, have
been exposed across all computing platforms [56, 54]. From smartphones [45, 90]
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to tablets and from enterprise servers [93] to common household machines [139],
all have become part of this covert and illegal mining ecosystem governed and
managed by hackers specializing in cryptomining.
Of the platforms targeted by these mining hackers, clouds and datacenters have
been the most effective and profitable for two reasons. First, the sheer amount
of resources needed for a covert cryptomining operation are readily available in
a cloud setting. Furthermore, since mined coins can easily be transferred to the
attacker using a simple anonymized wallet address, it makes the “get away” a lot
easier [11]. As a result, numerous instances of this targeted cloud abuse have
already been uncovered, whereby attackers successfully broke into clouds and
deployed cryptominers at a massive scale by spawning numerous VM instances
dedicated exclusively to mining [54, 99, 33, 34, 88]. The advent of GPU clouds,
such as those operated by Amazon, Microsoft and Cirrascale, have further incen-
tivized attackers to transfer their operations onto clouds and leverage the power of
parallel computing, as GPUs often have higher hash rates and perform better for
certain mining algorithms.
To make matters worse, deploying mining operations across different cloud in-
frastructure has become easy for hackers as they can exploit the loopholes in the
freemium business model. Hackers can cumulate the complimentary resources
allocated to individual accounts and build a large enough pool that can be exploi-
ted in clever ways [137, 79, 123], such as building an unlimited “slack space” on
top of small storage shares in Dropbox [92]. This issue has recently gained more
traction amongst cloud vendors with Google expressly forbidding any mining-
related activity in its free tier resources [129]. Furthermore, cloud vendors also
offer free resources under specialized programs, such as to app developers and
students. These resources can be used for mining as the cloud vendor has no way
of determining if these resources are being misused or if a developer/student is
simply building useful applications on top of such resources. As evidence to these
freeloading issues, researchers recently constructed a mining botnet on Amazon
entirely out of free resources [54]. The mining botnet was capable of generating
cryptocoins worth thousands of dollars on a weekly basis and went completely
undetected, being entirely oblivious to the cloud vendor despite its large footprint
and conspicuous behavior.
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1.3 COVERT AND SIDE CHANNELS
Given the sensitivity of user data, it is imperative for cloud providers to ensure
that data remains private and protected against any and all data exfiltration mecha-
nisms. Unfortunately, the very nature of the cloud is multi-tenant, and hence this
data protection becomes a serious challenge. Sharing the same infrastructure bet-
ween multiple tenants is crucial for achieving economies of scale via cost savings
arising from shared management, statistical multiplexing and efficient utilization
of a limited set of resources [110]. This necessity of sharing infrastructure le-
ads to the danger of information leakage between tenants (and data exfiltration
in general), which can be highly detrimental and can result in major costs for
businesses [49, 37, 152, 3, 101]
This problem becomes more severe given the emergence of massive cyberespi-
onage based malware ecosystems such as GhostNet [138], ShadowNet [112] and
Axiom [109]. These global crime rings systematically compromise machines in
governments and organizations, with the single and solitary objective of leaking
out confidential data (often hosted on data centers), either openly or in most cases
via stealthy covert channels to avoid detection and traceback. The discovery of
critical vulnerabilities, such as Heartbleed [135] and ShellShock [150], on a re-
gular basis has further exacerbated the situation by providing malicious actors a
broad spectrum of attack vectors. The only remaining challenge for data thieves
is to exfiltrate the data via cleverly concealed covert and side channels. Hence,
this problem has reemerged as a major cause for concern especially in the cloud
arena.
To prove the existence of these channels in modern commercial clouds, re-
searchers recently demonstrated that despite being logically isolated at the host
level (using hypervisors), VMs sharing the same machine can still leak sensitive
information via covert and side channels [110, 159, 155, 154, 164, 106]. Many
mitigation schemes have since been proposed that provide some protection against
these attacks either at the host level [147, 68, 142, 165, 154] or via network-based
appliances that deploy a clever combination of network monitoring, access cont-
rol, firewalls etc., to prevent leakage even if the machine is compromised [106].
However, the attack space of these covert and side channels is so large that it is
quite impossible to remove them in their entirety, particularly given that the un-
derlying resources are shared. Hence, as we show in this thesis also, network and
host-based channels are easy to establish and can be devastating to data privacy.
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1.4 WHY IS ABUSE IMPORTANT?
Covert and cleverly concealed abuse of resources is a substantial concern for
cloud vendors due to numerous reasons. First, valuable resources are wasted,
which can otherwise be allocated to other legitimate paying users resulting in loss
of revenue. Second, for mining-related abuse, hackers use the CPU/GPU to its full
compute capacity for extended periods of time (to achieve the maximum hash rate
possible) generating a lot of heat. Given that cooling is a major cost factor in da-
tacenters [46, 30], excessive heat from mining operations substantially decreases
profits. Similarly, the consistent utilization of the CPU/GPU in the aforementio-
ned case also greatly impacts the power consumption and drives up the electricity
bills. Fourth, abuse of network resources (as in the case of DDoS attacks) causes
congestion and degrades the quality of service for other tenants sharing the same
network infrastructure. Furthermore, firewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDPSs) external to the cloud, end up blocking IP addresses that they observe
misbehaving. This blacklisting is consequential for cloud vendors, as legitimate
tenants are also blocked at that firewall since the IP is often shared (due to NATing
implied by the vendor) [55]. Finally, it is quite challenging to detect covert and
size channels (both host and network-based), and often go completely undetected
in cloud environments [132, 155, 111]. This can lead to major data breaches
that can have substantial consequences and impacts the reputation of the provider.
Hence, it is imperative for CSPs to detect and thwart any secretive or open abuse
of resources in real-time before different losses stack up and customers jump ship.
1.5 STATE OF CLOUD DEFENSES
To defend against attacks, vendors deploy diverse and in-depth defenses (mix
of software and hardware), such as anti-DDoS boxes [167], Firewalls, Vulerabi-
lity and Virus Scanners [168] etc. However, there are numerous shortcomings
associated with these traditional defense approaches. First, most of the hardware-
based defenses are configured to detect and thwart incoming attacks and do not
necessarily examine patterns of cloud abuse emerging from within. The primary
reason being that these middleboxes are expensive (to deploy and maintain) and
to cater to a wide variety of abuse requires a comprehensive detection and mitiga-
tion framework examining the security spectrum end-to-end. Furthermore, when
it comes to cloud hosts, there is little or no support for hardware-based solutions
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and vendors predominantly rely on software solutions (which have their own is-
sues). Second, software defenses are often placed on wrong layers of the software
stack, for instance anti-viruses are mostly deployed inside the VM or container
instance. In the case of VM hijacking, such mitigation mechanisms are easy to
bypass or turn off if the attacker gets root access. Alternatively, in the case of ma-
licious deployments by attackers, using compromised user accounts [33] or free
resources [54], defense mechanisms are altogether ignored as the attacker him-
self is the “admin”. As a result, break-ins often go completely unnoticed [34,
54, 88]. To prove the fact that vendors are unaware of these break-ins, resear-
chers recently managed to setup a large botnet on Amazon EC2 that did not get
flagged by any detection or mitigation mechanism that EC2 might have had [54].
Another common approach is to inspect VMs from the hypervisor using Virtual
Machine Introspection (VMI) [103, 72, 35, 149]. However, VMI simply cannot
scale to cover the expanse of modern clouds [61]. Furthermore, it often requires
OS modification [31] or user participation [9] forcing vendors to resort to VMI
retroactively after an abuse has happened and reported. Given these challenges
and the stakes involved, CSPs need to deploy scalable defenses, “outside” of the
containers/VMs.
In light of all the evidence presented above, this thesis attempts to address the
following problem:
Research Question: What type of defenses and security mechanisms are needed
for abuse prevention in cloud and where should they be deployed in the cloud
stack?
1.6 PROACTIVE ABUSE DETECTION AND PREVENTION
Given the question before us, we propose the design of a comprehensive infra-
structure with numerous different components, each positioned at a unique layer
in the cloud stack, to provide a security toolbox targeting cloud abuse. Since the
layers being abused start from the VM (IaaS) all the way to the top i.e., the ap-
plications (SaaS), we want to build solutions that fall outside of these layers and
perform monitoring in a VM-oblivious fashion. To this end, we propose four key
components for the overall infrastructure: 1) an anomaly detection fabric that ta-
kes the diverse nature of data center workloads into account and offers customized
protection to each client via a paired mechanism of whitelisting plus blacklisting
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based on system call monitoring. 2) a hypervisor tool (MineGuard) employing
hardware-assisted behavioral monitoring using Hardware Performance Counters
to accurately detect the signature of malware (miner in our case specifically). The
proposed system can track low-level mining operations or events within the CPU
and GPU with minimal overhead in real-time. 3) A moving target defense tool,
which migrates entire tenant deployments and substantially reduces the possibility
of covert or side channel by making the attackers job very hard (near improbable).
4) A comprehensive tenant reputation system that keeps track of each tenant’s
history allowing us to leverage tenants’ behavioral records while monitoring and
migrating them. Together these four components allow us to formulate our hypot-
hesis for this thesis:
Proposed Thesis Statement: VM-oblivious defenses coupled with dynamic re-
positioning of deployments can address a wide spectrum of challenges associated
with cloud abuse.
To this end, below we highlight some contributions we have made in this work:
1.7 SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS
Below, we define each component of the overall infrastructure along with the
prominent contributions of each:
1.7.1 Collaborative Anomaly Detection via Syscall Monitoring
We present a promising syscall-based monitoring solution that can scale to
thousands of servers without compromising accuracy of detection. Individual
VMs performing similar tasks are monitored for any observed anomalies and then
analyzed at a global level to determine if the anomaly is in fact malicious or not. If
deemed malicious, a vaccine (sequence of syscalls) is generated and sent to each
VM, which prevents the said sequence from executing. Contributions include the
following:
• We present the design of a scalable and practical anomaly detection fabric
with negligible space and runtime overheads and highly accurate detection
rates.
• We introduce the concept of VM communities, which helps with creating
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strong signatures of normal behavior and collaboration at a global level to
detect and thwart attacks.
• We present a model for generating a per community vaccine that can thwart
ongoing attacks instantly without disrupting service to the tenant.
• We present a space-efficient way of representing and processing syscalls
using Cuckoo Filters.
1.7.2 Fine-Grained Tenant Monitoring using Micro-Architectural Patterns
MineGuard is a hypervisor tool based on hardware-assisted behavioral moni-
toring to accurately detect covert mining in clouds (≈99.7%). We use Hardware
Performance Counters (HPCs), a set of special-purpose registers built into modern
processors, to profile low-level mining operations or events within the CPU/GPU
with very little overhead (< 0.01%). Whether attackers use free resources or spin-
up mining VMs maliciously, they cannot deceive MineGuard as 1) it attempts to
catch the inherent mining behavior that any miner must adhere to if it is to mine
for a particular coin and 2) it is more privileged than a VM and hence cannot be
turned off or bypassed. We make the following contributions:
• We perform a first-of-its-kind comprehensive study to explore the beha-
vior of cryptocurrency mining focusing on micro-architectural execution
patterns.
• We characterize the noise that is introduced into each HPC value individu-
ally due to virtualization; and show the best-fit distribution for this noise in
each case, which can be used for error-correction.
• To incorporate this noise into our behavior profiles we develop a step-by-
step signature creation process that captures an evolving profile of mining
malware in increasingly noisier environments making it more robust.
• We build a user space tool, MineGuard, that can run on top of any hyper-
visor or host OS and perform real-time detection with negligible overhead.
MineGuard has a small footprint, is hard to evade, and cannot be compromi-
sed by malicious VMs. Additionally, if trained on various malware profiles,
we believe MineGuard can be extended for generic malware detection with
no modification needed to the source code.
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1.7.3 Thwarting Covert and Side Channels via Dynamic Repositioning of
Entire Deployments
Since covert and side channels are usually undetectable, we try to determine
which mechanisms can be the most devastating in a cloud setting. To this end we
build cloud-specific high-speed covert and side channels despite a wide variety
of host and network-based security mechanisms deployed by the cloud provider.
Since, past work presents a large number of host-based channels, we focus on
the network side. We achieve very high bit rates in the presence of real-life cross
traffic whilst remaining undetectable. To mitigate the aforementioned channels
and all others presented in the literature, we present hopping schemes that build
on the moving target defense approach. Since, these channels can never be fully
eliminated in a shared-resource setting, we present multiple different schemes
that minimize the amount of time spent sharing the same set of resources. Our
contributions are listed below:
• We demonstrate how to practically build high-speed network-based chan-
nels in clouds. We test the practicality on commercial clouds, such as EC2
and Azure and demonstrate orders of magnitude greater bit rates than any
previous work in the data center networks domain.
• To better understand the problem space, we construct a formal analytical
model of the channel, and present an information-theoretic upper bound
on the bit rate of the channel along with an optimal scheme, which nearly
achieves the upper bound.
• We analyze the difficulty of detecting the proposed channel by estimating
the Hurst exponent in the presence of cross traffic and show that the channel
can easily blend in background noise.
• To mitigate the proposed channel and others in the cloud space, we present
an approach, which leverages live migration techniques to dynamically re-
position flows, VMs and entire tenants to different parts of the cloud based
on optimization constraints and trust boundaries. We demonstrate, both em-
pirically and analytically that our mitigation scheme substantially reduces
the achievable leakage rates and makes it very hard for attackers to achieve
co-residency.
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1.7.4 A Tenant Reputation System for Clouds for Automatic Policy
Enforcement:
To dynamically adapt per-tenant security policies, we need to keep track of the
tenant’s past behavior along with the current state of affairs. A paying tenant with
a clean history should not be shut down immediately if observed misbehaving as
their VMs are probably compromised with high likelihood. Similarly, a brand new
tenant using free-resources should be immediately quarantined if seen abusing re-
sources. Furthermore, this should happen automatically without the involvement
of any administrator so as to make the solution scalable for clouds. To this end we
make the following contributions:
• A real-time adaptive sampling system that allows a network monitor to 1)
update sampling rates in real-time with minimal overhead on the switches
and 2) observe tenant traffic patterns with varying detail (adaptive tenant
profiling).
• A comprehensive tenant reputation system, which keeps track of the history
of each tenant and updates the history in real-time based on events observed
in the current cycle.
• A design to deploy the whole infrastructure as a fabric (an elastic tenant
owned by the vendor themselves) to prevent scale issues arising from all the
monitoring and processing of each tenant’s behavior.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE SURVEY
Cloud abuse is a broad term and is used to define a whole host of issues. For the
purposes of this thesis, we restrict ourselves to the case where a resource is used
in a manner not consistent with the cloud provider’s vision for standard usage of
that resource. Often this is defined in the Service Level Agreement (SLA) or the
Acceptable Use Policy (AUP). However, often times the policy is unclear or does
not explicitly categorize an action as abuse but the effects are detrimental to either
the vendor, other tenants or actors in the Internet at large. When carried out with
this particular intention, we classify an action as abuse. To address the issue of
abuse, this thesis covers several different aspects of cloud computing in particular,
and system and security in general and we visit each one separately below:
2.1 ABUSE OF HOST RESOURCES
Cloud abuse has become a hot topic of research for both industry and acade-
mia alike. Recent efforts [140, 57, 127, 166] have been geared towards deve-
loping a sound understanding of the vulnerabilities inherent to clouds and how
these vulnerabilities can be exploited to abuse clouds for nefarious purposes. Ot-
hers have actually demonstrated novel ways of exploiting these vulnerabilities by
building practical systems that are of value to attackers, such as file sharing appli-
cations [137], unlimited storage banks [92], email-based storage overlays [123],
power-based attack tools [160], booters for hire [29], mining botnets [54] etc.,
amongst a plethora of others.
A related line of work attempts to describe the infrastructure and mechanism
of mining botnets. Huang et al. [56] present a thorough investigation of mining
ecosystems in the wild. They claim that mining is less profitable than other mali-
cious activities, such as spamming or booter-renting (DDoS for hire), and should
be used as a secondary monetizing scheme. However, we believe that it is unfair
to compare mining profits with other monetizing activities as the price of coins
varies substantially over time and as of this writing, the value of one Bitcoin is
hovering around the $10k mark (and rising) as opposed to $100 in 2013, which de-
monstrates that mining can generate at least an order of magnitude more revenue
now. Furthermore, as mining uses an orthogonal set of resources (CPU/GPU and
memory) compared to DDoS attacks (network), we postulate that botnet-herders
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are probably maximizing profits by running various resource-disjoint monetizing
activities in parallel making a strong case for covert cryptomining. Similarly, rese-
archers at BlackHat recently demonstrated how to setup a mining botnet on Ama-
zon without triggering the security mechanisms deployed for protection against
such abuse [54]. The span of the botnet was so vast, that it could mine for coins
worth thousands of dollar each week.
Covert channels are a serious threat on multi-user shared systems and have been
implemented on various shared resources such as processor caches [104], input
devices [120], network stacks [119], file systems [69], virtual memory [143], and
more [70, 44]. Since we are specifically interested in virtual environments we
present detailed discussion of those applicable to clouds here. A large body of
research presents the design of host-based covert and side channels on commercial
clouds and virtualized environments [155, 110, 159, 157]. These channels were
based on low level hardware, such as the processor cache and the system bus, in
order to thwart any software-based isolation mechanisms deployed by the cloud
vendor. Although these channels were primarily presented as side channels, an
adversary may conveniently use the same mechanisms to covertly send data to
colluding VMs on the same server as demonstrated by Xiao et al. [157]. Many
mechanisms have since been proposed to detect and thwart these channels, such as
modified cache architectures and dedicated servers [147, 68, 142, 107], however
none of these schemes can thwart network-based channels because of the use of a
medium, which is highly multiplexed across a multitude of different tenants.
2.2 ABUSE OF NETWORK RESOURCES
A large body of literature deals with the study of Inter-Packet Delay-based
(IPD) covert channels over traditional protocols such as IP/TCP or HTTP with
a comprehensive survey available here [163]. However, there has been very little
work to date that studies covert channels specifically in the context of modern,
cross-machine data center networks operating under Software Defined and tradi-
tional networks. It is not clear how well traditional IPD channels will work in
the cloud domain given the fact that cloud vendors employ strict isolation mecha-
nisms and the infrastructure is significantly more complex (e.g., load balancers
and anti-DDoS network boxes) with different sharing semantics. Additionally,
the distinctive nature of network traffic in clouds, high processing speeds of the
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network infrastructure and the use of SDNs leaves many unanswered questions,
which have not yet been explored. Sadeghi et al. [113] present the design of an
IPSec-based VPN, which attempts to thwart covert channels arising from sharing
of resources across LANs. However, their end-host based approach does not mi-
tigate our attack, as it does not prevent delay variations from being transmitted
across flows, which is exploited by our attack. Bates et al. [10] recently proposed
a network-flow watermarking scheme that borders our work. However, this work
focuses on determining co-residency as opposed to covert channels. The threat
model we consider is also harder in the sense that cross-tenant communication
between trusted and untrusted tenants is strictly forbidden meaning that cross-
Virtual Network routing is disallowed. Furthermore, we develop a formal analyti-
cal model of our channel to study its characteristics and come up with information
theoretic bounds on the leakage rate, which is not considered in these prior works.
Additionally our work also encompasses various network environments such as
SDNs, which, to the best of our knowledge, have never been explored in any
work previously. Kanuparthy et al. [64] employ the same basic principle as ours
however their work is not targeted towards building high speed covert channels
in data centers, rather they argue the accuracy of the approach and demonstrate
some degree of success in general internet routing domains and as an application
of their approach mention covert channels. Some researchers have also proposed
timing-based covert channels that attempt to mimic legitimate traffic patterns [18]
to blend in with the non-malicious traffic. Others have focused more on provable
undetectability of covert channels in independent and identically distributed (i.i.d)
traffic [116, 77] – these works are geared primarily towards reducing detectability
of covert channels, which are orthogonal but could be applied to our channel.
2.3 DETECTION AND PREVENTION OF ABUSE IN CLOUDS
Here we cover the origins and building blocks of our proposed schemes and
some competing ideas to abuse prevention in clouds.
2.3.1 Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI)
To detect the aforementioned cloud abuse at the host-level, researchers have
proposed a technique known as Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI), which gi-
ves vendors the ability to look inside the contents of a VM and detect unwarran-
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ted activity [103, 72, 35, 9, 61, 149]. However, VMI sometimes requires user
participation [9] or OS modification [102] and can have large overheads [61, 35].
Additionally, traditional VMI approaches lack the scalability needed in the cloud
setting, which makes them unsuitable for the cloud case. Resultantly, cloud ven-
dors mostly resort to VMI retroactively once an abuse is reported to have occurred
via other less-invasive and simpler methods. Others have tried to bridge the se-
mantic gap between the guest’s view of its internal state and the hypervisor’s view
of the VM [61].
2.3.2 Secure and Trusted Execution Environments
Similarly, a rich body of literature aims at creating secure execution environ-
ments, such as SecVisor [118] and Secure Virtual Architecture [27], to allows
client isolated work spaces for the execution of sensitive code and data in a virtual
environment. Although, this work is orthogonal to ours, as our systems are still
useful in these contexts and can work in tandem with these secure environments,
we still cover them here given the overlapping security space. Attempts have been
made to minimize the trusted computing base while simultaneously providing iso-
lated “containers”, such as TrustVisor [86] and Flicker [85]. These systems sus-
pend the untrusted part of the software stack so that the secure container is not
compromised during execution. Similarly, the industry is hard at work trying to
provide the same guarantees using hardware via technologies such as Intel Trus-
ted Platform Module (TPM) [60], Trusted Execution Technology (TXT) [59] and
the most recent Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [25].
2.3.3 System Call Monitoring
The literature is abundant with research focusing on system call monitoring in
the traditional case [42, 134, 52, 148, 17, 158, 19, 22, 43] and the virtualized
case [71, 73, 100, 4], however, no work prior to ours, has targeted a fully scala-
ble and extensible, cloud centric system call monitoring framework that can be
practically deployed in a commercial data center. The closest work to ours is from
Alarifi and Wolthusen [4], who present a syscall analysis framework for the IaaS
model based on strace [76]. Their design, however, does not target scalability and
does not leverage features innate to the cloud like ours. Furthermore, they do not
address the problem of space overhead resulting from the syscall instrumentation
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as we do. Additionally, we also present avenues for the extension of our work,
such as the added HPC monitoring framework, which itself has been the subject
of various research endeavors [32, 67, 133, 41], however it has not been discussed
in the context of syscall monitoring prior to this work. Others have demonstrated
how to sample and collect system calls in virtual environments in a VM-oblivious
fashion [73, 71, 100] and serve as inspiration to this work.
The fundamentals of the syscall monitoring were laid out by Forest et al. [40],
Hofmeyr et al. [52] and Warrender et al. [148], in their pioneering works by de-
monstrating how sequences of system call originating from a process could be
monitored for anomalous behavior. The systems involved a training phase during
which sequences of system calls were recorded forming a set, which served as the
baseline for “normal” behavior. Once actual execution began, outside of the trai-
ning phase, all sequences that were absent from the set of normal behavior were
flagged as anomalous. However, the approaches discussed had an inherent trade-
off pertaining to the duration of the training period; larger sizes resulted in lesser
false positives but higher false negatives where as smaller durations would sub-
stantially increase false positives. Subsequently, Locasto et al. [78] demonstrated
a way to reduce false positives without compromising on the false negatives by
leveraging the uniformity of behavior in “application communities”. Other rese-
archers [98, 80] explored the temporal correlation between flagged system calls
across distinct instances of the same program to improve detection rates further.
2.3.4 Hardware Performance Counter-Based Monitoring
Finally, there has been much research on detecting generic malware using archi-
tectural and microarchitectural execution patterns, such as HPCs, with differing
results. Demme et al. [32] build a system for detection of generic malware and de-
monstrate the feasibility of the design based on ARM (Android) and Intel (Linux)
platforms. Other researchers [67, 133, 41, 162] have also used low-level hardware
features to promising success, furthering the work of Demme et al. In addition to
generic malware, HPCs have also been successfully used to detect kernel-level
rootkits [145], side-channel attacks [23], integrity checking of programs [81], and
firmware [144] and control flow modifications [156]. However, none of these pre-
vious works try to accommodate the noise introduced by virtualization, as we do
in this thesis.
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2.3.5 Covert and Side Channels
The research community has digressed along two different directions to defend
against cache-based covert channels. HomeAlone [165] attempts to detect covert
channels and identify the malicious VMs by acting as the receiver of the covert
message. Along a different line, architects have proposed modifications to cache
architectures in order to defend against these cache-based covert channels on vir-
tualized environments. Notable among these are RPcache [147], PLcache [68]
and Newcache [146] which build on ideas based on cache partitioning and rand-
omizing memory-cache mappings. These new cache designs are quite effective
against cache-based covert channels however they have a high deployment and
adaptation cost which makes them infeasible for use with commodity hardware.
Industrial CSPs such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) have opted for dedica-
ted servers where instances from different users are housed on different physical
servers. These so called Virtual Private Clouds (VPC) completely eliminate the
problem of multi-tenancy however this does not come cheap for the users and be-
ars heavily in terms of power supply for the vendors as well. Even though this
approach can be used for virtualization on the edges it is highly impractical for
the core. The network is still shared even when traffic is traversing separate and
distinct Virtual Private Networks (VPN) which again creates sharing and presents
an opportunity for abuse.
2.3.6 Reputation Systems
Reputations systems have been the subject of numerous research endeavors [62,
1, 48, 51, 63, 20, 84]. Reputation can either be determined from within the ecosy-
stem or via a third party, which is observing the behavior and the interaction of
actors within the system. Kablan et al. [62] describe the benefits of using a repu-
tation system for tenants in the cloud. Their framework, Siet, calculates the repu-
tation based on network activity metrics by building a reputation graph from user
feedback. Despite being similar to our proposed work in theme, they primarily
discuss the construction of a reputation system itself where as we are more focu-
sed on the application of such a reputation system to build an automated response
system that enhances the security of the entire data center. Similarly, Hwang et
al. [1] discuss trust management systems in the context of P2P networks and how
they can be adapted and used as an overlay to mitigate attacks such as DDoS,
worms etc.
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CHAPTER 3: TECHNICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND GOALS
As mentioned in Section 1.7, this thesis comprises 4 systems that together form
the security infrastructure available to cloud vendors to mitigate cloud abuse. The
system call monitoring component and the HPC-based tool, MineGuard operate
at the host level. Similarly, the component resposible for the prevention of covert
and side channels, and our path hopping framework along with the full deploy-
ment migration feature operates at the network layer and involves the provisioning
and orchestration services as well. The last component, i.e., the tenant reputation
framework is distributed across the cloud stack. However, even though each com-
ponent is deployed at a different location, the major design goals are the same.
Hence, before we present the details pertaining to each component, we first pre-
sent the design goals that we want to adhere by:
3.1 DESIGN GOALS
Before we go on to present the architecture of our system, we discuss some
objectives in light of which we have made our design choices. We assume the
hypervisor to be part of the trusted code base and cannot be compromised. Furt-
hermore, we put no constraints on the degree to which malware can compromise
the guest OS running inside the VMs. The goals below must adhere to our ide-
ology that tenants should be oblivious of all monitoring and migrations and that
defenses should be spread across multiple layers of the cloud stack to prevent
specific kinds of abuse.
3.1.1 Scalability
The system should be able to scale easily without loss of performance or functi-
onality. Given the expanse of clouds today, any effective security mechanism
should encompass the entirety of the surface area. In our case, all hosts should
be uniformly covered under the proposed scheme. Furthermore, if more servers
are added to the data center, the solution should only require a small amount of




The system should be architected with a strong focus on clouds. It should con-
sider the peculiarities that constitute data centers today, such as inter tenant attacks
and co-residency issues, when designing defenses and leverage the underlying fe-
atures of clouds as well, such as elasticity and fault tolerance, to strengthen and
improve the overall architecture.
3.1.3 Tolerable Overhead
Indeed for security to be deployed proactively on a per-node basis, there is
going to be some overhead involved. However, the overhead should be tolerable
and not defeat the purpose of running jobs in the cloud. We envision three types
of overheads for host-based security mechanisms i.e., instrumentation, detection
and mitigation. Any kind of space, compute or runtime overheads associated with
either of these should be minimal to keep vendors interested and users satisfied.
3.1.4 Decision on Local Plus Global Visibility
Anomalies can be flagged even if observed on a single VM and should be in-
spected further, however before the system takes any drastic mitigation measures,
such as shutting the VM down for forensic analysis or blacklisting the tenant, it
should take into consideration the global state of affairs in other “related” VMs,
such as coresident or sister VMs so that a more informed decision can be taken.
3.1.5 Near Real-Time
If the system is going to protect against zero-day threats, then it needs to be
either real-time or near real-time at the least. This requirement would protect the
spillover of the infection to other VMs or even other tenants as the malware can
be quickly contained at its origin. Furthermore, if the monitoring is real-time then
other nodes can be alerted of the zero-day threat before any substantial damage is
done in the form of wasted resources.
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3.1.6 Deployability and Applicability
The user should not be involved in any capacity in any part of the design. The
architecture should not require modifications to any component running inside the
VMs nor should it interfere with the normal execution of the guest OS and applica-
tions. Furthermore, the design should be flexible enough so that it can work with
most hypervisors available today and should be easy to deploy into commercial
clouds with minimal modifications needed to the orchestration infrastructure.
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CHAPTER 4: COLLABORATIVE ANOMALY DETECTION VIA
SYSCALL MONITORING
The chapter discusses the design and implementation of a scalable cloud-friendly
fabric that allows for the detection of anomalies across groups of VMs that are part
of the same tenant deployment performing the same set of tasks (VM community),
such as an Apache Server farm. This is achieved by monitoring sliding sequences
of syscalls in real-time and checking against known records of normal behavior.
Once an anomaly is found across a threshold number of VMs it is deemed as ma-
licious and all VMs are sent a vaccine, which prevents the execution of the said
sequence on the system.
4.1 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW
To address the host-level security concerns identified in Chapter 1, we propose
an anomaly detection fabric that takes the diverse nature of data center workloads
into account and offers customized protection to each client via a paired mecha-
nism of whitelisting plus blacklisting. We apply the syscall monitoring work done
by earlier researchers to develop a highly scalable cloud-centric system. By mo-
nitoring the sequence of system calls originating from a “community” of VMs or
containers (set of instances performing the same task), during the training phase,
we can develop a profile for normal behavior and flag any sequence that appears
anomalous during runtime (whitelisting). Such flagged sequences are then pas-
sed on for further analysis to determine if they are malicious or not. If deemed
dangerous, they are prevented from execution on all instances of the community
(blacklisting).
Syscall monitoring has been shown to be a promising behavioral malware de-
tection technique, excelling at detecting zero-day threats during their early sta-
ges [19] and mitigating DoS attacks. Furthermore, syscall monitoring can also
flag malware that can evade traditional defenses [19], such as metamorphic and
polymorphic viruses. As a result, our syscall-based solution is accurate with very
low false positives and can scale to thousands of servers due to two main design
features. Firstly, we compress the data stream (logs of system calls) at its source
by the novel use of Cuckoo Filters [38] removing the space overhead commonly
associated with syscall solutions. Furthermore, this design choice also has the
advantage of reducing the compute overhead of matching against raw syscall logs
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as anomaly detection is reduced to a mere membership test on the Cuckoo Filter.
Secondly, we perform malware analysis on the flagged anomalous sequences on
separate instances, which are part of a large distributed fabric owned by the cloud
vendor. This allows us to leverage the strengths of clouds and scale the system as
needed during high usage times. This also removes any single point of failure from
the system. We also discuss ways of extending our design to make detection and
mitigation more robust by using syscall monitoring in conjunction with architec-
tural and micro-architectural execution patterns, such as Hardware Performance
Counter (HPC) monitoring, which is another promising area of research [32, 67,
133, 41].
Our design is based on two key insights. Firstly, for a particular tenant de-
ployment, groups of VMs are assigned the same set of specialized tasks, which
they perform repeatedly. Common examples of these include sets of VMs re-
sponsible for graph processing in social networking deployments, MapReduce
deployments, database queries in large big data deployments, image processing in
medical science deployments etc. Such operations are scaled across a deployment
of several “sister” VMs, which we call a community [78], all of which exhibit the
same signature under normal circumstances. A compromised VM or container,
on the other hand, would generate a different signature from its sisters and can be
flagged in real-time. The second insight we leverage is that if a small percentage
of VMs/containers belonging to a tenant are suspended and their tasks migrated to
new instances, the tenant will not notice a major performance degradation caused
by the jitter. Hence, borrowing from the concept of “sacrificing the few for the
good of the many”, we leverage the first few VMs that are the initial targets of a
zero-day attack (we cannot protect these VMs in any event) to protect the entire
deployment by sharing information on the behavior of the attack and generating a
“vaccine” that is broadcast to the entire community. The attacked VMs are then
suspended (and can be quarantined for detailed forensic analysis) and substituted
with immunized ones that are resilient against the ongoing attack (as they have
the vaccine). This prevents a particular malicious behavior from executing on
the entire set of sister VMs and contains the infection from spreading across the
remaining deployment while maintaining a steady supply of VMs.
Key Contributions:
• We present the design of a scalable and practical anomaly detection fabric
with negligible space and runtime overheads and highly accurate detection
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rates. The distributed nature of the fabric allows it to accommodate thou-
sands of servers without incurring any slowdown.
• We introduce the concept of VM communities, which helps with creating
strong signatures of normal behavior and collaboration at a global level to
detect and thwart attacks. Communities also allow for reduced profiling
times during training.
• We present a model for generating a per community vaccine that can thwart
ongoing attacks instantly without disrupting service to the tenant. The
technique takes into account localized feedback (anomalies) received from
each VM but performs the analysis at the global level.
• We present a space-efficient way of representing and processing syscalls
using Cuckoo Filters. The design does away with the overhead (both storage
and compute) that has traditionally plagued syscall monitoring systems.
4.2 SUMMARY OF ARCHITECTURE
Our scheme uses syscall monitoring techniques outlined in past work [73, 100,
71, 80, 98, 42, 134] to develop a comprehensive real-time anomaly/malware
detection scheme consistent with the requirements of modern day commercial
clouds. Our design is comprised of 3 components namely the Instrumentation
Agent, the Detection Agent and the Analysis Agent as shown in Figure 4.1. The
Instrumentation Agent and Detection Agent reside on each host where as the Ana-
lysis Agent is distributed across the cloud (in a scalable fabric) to cut down round
trip times and save bandwidth. Each Instrumentation Agent monitors and logs the
syscalls of each VM and the Detection Agent checks all VMs from the same com-
munity for anomalous sequences. The Analysis Agent determines if the anomalies
are malicious or not by performing a correlation analysis on anomalous sequences
observed across different VMs. Our system is built on the STIDE model [40] of
syscall monitoring, which deals with time ordered sliding sequences of syscalls,
known as a tuple or a window. This model allows us to perform set operations on
the tuples of syscalls, such as union, intersection, addition etc. which will be used












































Figure 4.1: Bird’s eye view of our system call-based design showing various
components that comprise the anomaly-detection fabric. Additionally, the figure
also illustrates the concept of VM communities and how they’re spread across
the data center.
4.2.1 VM/Container Communities
The advent of cloud computing has substantially altered conventional program-
ming paradigms. New and emerging distributed and parallel computing schemes,
such as MapReduce, Scala and Cuda, have enabled users to unlock the true po-
tential of data centers. However, these new programming models require that a
computation be split up and divided across numerous parallel workers speciali-
zing in repeatedly performing the same set of tasks. Additionally, it is considered
good deployment practice to have specialized VMs/containers performing indivi-
dual tasks rather than a mix of workloads. This task specialization enables clouds
to scale more effectively as only the overloaded instances need to be scaled out
based on the increased demand of individual tasks. Modularization of compu-
tation, thus leads to “pools” of VMs or containers all performing the same task
and exhibiting similar behavior. We call such a pool a VM or container commu-
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nity. A single tenant deployment often comprises multiple communities, such as
VMs responsible for the frontend would be considered one community and in-
stances responsible for the backend would be another community. Additionally,
one community may be spaced out on multiple different servers or might have all
its members on the same cloud node based on the orchestration algorithm of the
cloud. Members of the same community are called sister VMs/containers. We
assume that identification of VM communities is done via the collaboration of the
user and the vendor for simplicity. This would also help the vendor in scheduling
the VMs more effectively over the servers by a coming up with a distribution whe-
reby a compute intensive VM is placed next to a VM that has a low demand for
processor usage to oversubscribe nodes as much as possible and maximize pro-
fits. Community identification could also be done without customer involvement
by looking at the VM footprints when the VMs first boot.
4.2.2 Building a Community-Wide Profile
System call monitors have to first build a profile of normal behavior for the
entity being monitored. This happens during the training phase, whereby all se-
quences of system calls of a fixed length, are monitored and logged as a set re-
presenting normal process behavior. During actual execution, sequences are again
monitored and checked against this set for legitimacy. If a sequence falls outside
of this set, it is flagged as anomalous. In the case of clouds, before we begin the
training phase we first divide a tenant deployment into communities, such that sets
of VMs are categorized as being responsible for certain specialized tasks. Once
these communities have been identified, we start profiling each VM in a com-
munity separately. We initiate the profiling process by building profiles for each
sister VM individually and hence we can cover more legitimate sequences of sy-
scalls by merging all profiles when the training phase ends (union of all observed
syscall tuples). This tactic, which leverages the elasticity of clouds, allows us to
work with shorter training periods by increasing the number of sister VMs being
profiled during the training phase. The length of the training phase depends on
the vendor. Typically, longer training intervals yield more accurate detection rates
and since we parallelize the training we can exhibit high accuracy despite shorter
intervals should the vendor choose so. Furthermore, the vendor can and should
choose different tuple sizes for each community to customize the features of the
monitoring framework based on the nature of the workload. This design choice is
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consistent with past works, which have shown different window sizes to be opti-
mal for different types of workloads, such as 6, 10, 11 etc. [4, 42, 52]. The profile
building task is the responsibility of the Instrumentation Agent.
4.2.3 Compressing the Data Stream
The first challenge that we address in our design is that of space overhead ge-
nerated due to syscall monitoring. Traditionally, it has been observed that the size
of raw syscall logs becomes so huge after just a few minutes into the production
phase that it makes the approach impractical and averse to scaling. Hence, we
compress the data stream i.e., the sequences of syscalls by using a Cuckoo Filter.
A Cuckoo Filter (an improved version of Bloom Filters with faster lookup times)
is a simple data structure that can house large amounts of data by using its own
space-efficient intermediate representation (array of bits) based on hashing and
respond to queries about set membership pertaining to the data it has housed (has
no false negatives). The Cuckoo Filter takes a string as input and maps its hash
onto an array by setting numerous disjoint indexes to 1. This scheme allows us to
represent the complete legitimate behavior of a tenant in the form of a single array
and search for anomalies by performing hash operations instead of parsing an en-
tire log. Each time a new sequence is observed, it is checked against the Cuckoo
Filter and if absent from the profile, is flagged as anomalous. Additionally, the De-
tection Agent, which is tasked with the detection of anomalous sequences, further
minimizes the space overhead by using just a single Cuckoo Filter per community
for all member VMs running on that host to check for compliance against normal
behavior.
4.2.4 Defending the Community
Researchers have postulated that sharing information about process infections
amongst collaborating nodes can provide security against said infections [78, 98].
Cloud computing is perfect for such a collaborative community-based protection
model, as jobs are parallelized and distributed onto a large number of worker
nodes all performing the same operation, MapReduce and graph processing are
excellent examples of this. Furthermore, vendors strongly advise against using
mixed workloads on top of single instances [4], which is also in line with the
community-based paradigm. Hence, porting the community model to cloud im-
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plies that the first few instances that get attacked share the characteristics and
features of the attack with the remaining sister VMs from the community. In
our design, these features of an ongoing attack are characterized by time ordered
sequences of syscalls. If the same anomalous sequence of syscalls is observed
across a predetermined threshold number of sister VMs, it can be flagged as mali-
cious and broadcast to the entire community. Of course, this anomalous sequence
could be a legitimate sequence that simply got missed during the training phase,
however, the probability that a missed legitimate sequence starts appearing on a
threshold number of VMs all at the same time is small. Determining which se-
quences are anomalous is the responsibility of the Detection Agent.
4.2.5 Generating a Vaccine
As mentioned, the vaccine alerts other VMs to dubious or malicious sequences
of syscalls. When a Detection Agent comes across a sequence that is not present
in its Cuckoo Filter, it marks the sequence and saves it in another Cuckoo Filter,
known as the Anomaly Filter. The Detection Agent inserts all anomalous tuples
into the Anomaly Filter and after a fixed time interval elapses (known as the mo-
nitoring cycle), which is a tunable metric representing how tolerant the system is
to attacks, the Detection Agent sends its Anomaly Filter to the Analysis Agent for
further inspection. The Analysis Agent is deployed as a distributed cloud tenant in
our design, which allows it to scale under load and have a divided footprint across
the data center to prevent any single point of failure. The Analysis Agent receives
one Anomaly Filter per VM, at the end of a monitoring cycle, from each Detection
Agent supervising a community giving the Analysis Agent a global view of the
state of the community. Since the Anomaly Filter is actually a Cuckoo Filter, its
simply an array of bits, the Analysis Agent can perform some basic counting ope-
rations on it. Specifically, the Analysis Agent adds together all Anomaly Filters
it has received from a community, which can be understood as the union of all
anomalous tuples, and determines which indexes cross a certain predetermined
threshold value (called vaccine threshold). It then creates another Cuckoo Filter
and sets the corresponding indexes, which have crossed the threshold value, to 1
and marks all others as 0. The resulting filter is what we call a vaccine and houses
the anomalous sequences, which have already appeared on a threshold number
of VMs in the community. The vaccine thus generated can be thought of as a
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Figure 4.2: Detailed schematic diagram showing how anomalies are flagged
individually but examined collectively to determine if they are malicious or
benign.
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operation is depicted in Figure 4.2. Upon vaccine generation, the Analysis Agent
broadcasts it to all Detection Agents in the community and requests the cloud or-
chestration framework to instantiate substitute VMs in place of the compromised
ones. The vaccine threshold can be tweaked to reduce the detection delay at the
cost of false positives.
4.2.6 Containing the Infection
Once a Detection Agent receives the vaccine, it checks all running sequences
in each sister VM against the vaccine to make sure that it too has not been com-
promised. If no hits are observed the VM is believed to be contamination-free
and allowed to continue execution otherwise it is reported to the Analysis Agent,
which in turn notifies the orchestration framework of the VM’s compromise. As
a result, the spread is contained before it causes further devastation. The client
experiences little or no degradation as substitute VMs are quickly spun up to meet
the demand.
4.2.7 Updating the Behavioral Profile
The Detection Agent sends all anomalous sequences to the Analysis Agent ho-
wever, not all sequences are malicious and some are in fact legitimate sequences
that got missed during the training phase. For instance, a very rare control flow
path in the application could result in the occurrence of such a sequence. Our
system keeps track of all anomalous sequences observed by a community that did
not pass the threshold for maliciousness, as mentioned above, and were only ob-
served on very few sister VMs (a benefit of the global visibility of the Analysis
Agent). Even though the sequence could still be malicious, for instance from a
stealthy malware, we would like to investigate it further and add it to the nor-
mal profile of the community if it turns out to be a benign sequence. This can
be done by checking the said sequence against a database of known blacklisted
syscall sequences [22] or by building a model of the community’s syscall beha-
vior and automatically generating “bad” sequences, as done by Giffin et al. [43],
and comparing against those or another venue is to use our secondary HPC-based
detection system. If the syscall sequence comes out clean we propose to add it
to the community’s base profile after a certain time interval has elapsed and the
sequence is recurring.
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4.3 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
As mentioned previously, there have been many proposals in recent literature
as to the mechanism for syscall monitoring. However, to keep things simple, we
resort to the Linux Perf tool, which is much faster than strace [115] and allows us
to work directly with the KVM Hypervisor without any modifications to the base
hypervisor. Furthermore, Perf also allows us to monitor Hardware Performance
Counters, which we use as a secondary detection mechanism. Our goal is not to
compare the various syscall approaches, in fact any of the described approaches
can be used in our system.
For the experiments we chose an Intel i7 3.40GHz x8 machine with 8GB of
RAM, 8.5GB of swap space and a 500GB hard drive. For the host, we had Ubuntu
15.10 based on 4.2.0 kernel version. For guests, we primarily stuck with Cloudera
Quickstart VM 5.5 which uses CentOS 6.7 however, other OSes work equally
well. The version of Perf was 4.2.8-ckt5. Where applicable, we chose the window
size to be 10, monitoring cycle to be 10s and vaccine threshold to be 4 percent.
4.3.1 Runtime Overhead of Instrumentation
One primary concern of our design was the runtime overhead generated by the
instrumentation process. Since our solution is designed for clouds where custo-
mers expect low job completion times, we wanted to make sure our system did
not slow down jobs to unacceptable levels. To this end, we chose 5 represen-
tative workloads, namely Hadoop MapReduce Image Processing (HIPI), Kernel
Compile, Video Encoding/Decoding, File Copying and Encryption/Decryption,
and ran them with and without system call instrumentation in place. During this
exercise we observed the job completion times of each task to get a sense of the
runtime overhead added by the instrumentation process. Figure 4.3 shows the
average numbers for the performed experiments over numerous runs. As demon-
strated, the added overhead in the job completion times of each of the 5 cloud
workloads is negligible. This means that the instrumentation phase of our system
is extremely low-overhead and resultantly scale-friendly. Furthermore, in general


































Figure 4.3: Runtime overhead of the system call instrumentation process over
different workloads.
4.3.2 Runtime Overhead of Detection
Our design is such that detection merely involves a constant time operation on
a Cuckoo Filter, which is a very high performance data structure. However, to as-
certain the scalability of our system, we wanted to ensure that the detection phase,
like the instrumentation phase, incurs tolerable overheads and maintains this con-
stant time characteristic when scaled to higher VM counts per node. Hence, we
ran the detection mechanism across a large number of processes running simul-
taneously, as shown in Figure 4.4. These delays were incurred by the detection
process, which checks a tuple of system calls for membership against the Cuckoo
Filter and adds any anomalies to the Anomaly Filter, for roughly 2 million system
calls. Results show that even when the VM count on a single node is high, the
system maintains its characteristic of constant time detection backing our claims
of scalability. Hence, in terms per node compute overhead, including both in-
strumentation and detection, our system is highly economical making it a perfect
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Figure 4.4: Runtime overhead of the detection phase over a workload generating
around 2 million system calls.
4.3.3 Space Overhead of Instrumentation/Detection
One prominent feature of our approach is the space efficient design, which is
achieved via the use of Cuckoo Filters. The idea behind Cuckoo Filters is to
absorb a large dataset and store it in a space efficient intermediate representation.
Despite the fact that the actual dataset is lost when converted to a Cuckoo Filter,
we can still run constant time queries pertaining to the dataset such as the presence
and absence of certain elements in the dataset. For our purposes, the Cuckoo Filter
houses the entire normal behavior of the community in question and we can run
queries against it to find out if a sequence is present or missing. This approach
offers a tremendous benefit in terms of space usage compared to raw logs as done
traditionally. Figure 4.5 attempts to quantify the benefits of using a Cuckoo Filter
as opposed to raw syscall logs. The size of a Cuckoo Filter remains pretty much
constant even when the system has been running for a decent amount of time as
opposed to raw logs, which start to incur a large amount of space overhead. This
result, together with the runtime overhead presented above, affirms our claims to
the overall scalability of our system.
4.3.4 Size of Cuckoo Filter vs Number of False Positives
As with other similar hash-based data structures, Cuckoo Filters offer a tradeoff
between size of the filter and the degree of false positives. With larger sizes,
Cuckoo Filters generate smaller number of false positives as they are able capture
and record a wide range of legitimate behavior while minimizing overlapping (two
strings hashing to the same indexes). Smaller filters on the other hand perform
poorly as they are poor representatives of the entire spectrum of normal behavior.
However, for our purposes, we wanted to investigate what size of the Cuckoo
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of the space overhead of our Cuckoo Filter-based
approach as opposed to using raw logs of system calls.























Figure 4.6: Relationship between the size of the Cuckoo Filter and false
positives.
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Filter generates acceptable false positives so that the network overhead can be
minimized. If the size at which false positives become acceptable is impractical
then Cuckoo Filters must be replaced with other alternate data structures, such
as Bloom Filters, which have been used by other researchers to reduce the space
overhead of various systems [42]. In Figure 4.6, we show that our choice of a
Cuckoo Filter is indeed justified as false positives can be reduced to negligible
levels by using very nominal sizes of the filter. With very small filters (<0.1MB)
the corresponding false positives are large due to the reason mentioned above.
With a 1MB Cuckoo Filter, our system exhibits almost 0% false positives, which
is remarkable given that we are able to represent the entire normal behavior of an
application in 1MB as opposed to tens of GB of raw syscall logs needed otherwise.
Also, worth mentioning is that on a single node, we only have one such Cuckoo
Filter per community, which means that the per node footprint of our system is
very small.
4.3.5 Length of Training Interval vs Number of False Positives
Another important metric for evaluation is the length of the training interval and
how it impacts the accuracy of detection. Since we are in a data center setting, the
vendor will usually not have enough time as the customer would want to move
onto the normal phase very quickly. Hence, to measure this relationship between
training interval and accuracy, we plot the training interval duration on the X-axis
and the corresponding percentage of false positives on the Y-axis in Figure 4.7.
As can be seen, there is decreasing trend in the number of false positives as the
training window increases. The percentage can be brought down to acceptable
levels within the hour for various workloads. If numerous sister VMs are being
simultaneously profiled then this interval can be reduced even further. Additio-
nally, if workloads are similar across tenants, the vendor can leverage the profile
of one tenant and use it directly (or with minimal training) for the other one.
4.3.6 Length of Window/Tuple of System Calls
Size of the tuple/window of system calls has been the subject of contention
in many prior works. Various researchers have used different window sizes by
empirically justifying their use of the size in the form of low false positives. Size
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Figure 4.7: Relationship between the length of the training interval and false
positives.
have been presented. Through our experiments as shown in Figure 4.8, we found
that as the window/tuple size increases, it loses the granularity at which system
call patterns change. Thus it is unable to detect those patterns and flag suspicious
behaviour. This causes an increase in false negatives. Hence, a balance needs to be
struck between speed, size and accuracy, which is different for different types of
workloads. Given this consideration we make this metric a tunable feature of our
design, with the vendor having the flexibility to work with larger or smaller sizes
based on the nature of the jobs being run inside the community and training time
available to the vendor. It is pertinent to mention here, that for our case, with larger
window sizes, the system works just as fast as the smaller window sizes because
of our use of the Cuckoo Filter. This is because the filter stores the sequences of
syscall in its own intermediate representation, which is pretty much the same for
any size of the tuple, and does away with the concept of an exhaustive entry by
entry perfect matching approach. Also, the numbers shown in Figure 4.8 improve
substantially if a larger training window is used, however, since our system is
designed for clouds and customers want to move to the production environment




























Figure 4.8: Varying rate of false negatives for different window/tuple sizes for
different workloads.
4.3.7 Vaccine Threshold and Monitoring Cycle vs False Positives, Detection
Rate and Malware Spread:
The threshold value used to generate the vaccine is again a tunable parameter.
Smaller values result in quicker generation of the vaccine however, this impro-
ved latency comes at the cost of increased false positives. In contrast, a larger
threshold value would mean that the Analysis Agent will wait to see more ano-
malous sequences in each of the incoming Anomaly Filters before flagging them
as malicious. This would result in a slight delay that might allow the malware to
spread across more members of the community. However, this will also reduce
the chance of false positives as a rare legitimate sequence, which was missed out
during the training phase, will not get flagged. Fig 4.9 captures this trade-off in-
herent to our system. The bars on the top are associated with the Y-axis on the
right and the bars below are tied to the Y-axis on the left. Along similar lines,
we ran a variant of this experiment to test the relationship between the spread of
malware to that of vaccine threshold and monitoring cycle. To explore this relati-
onship we exploited a vulnerability in the guest OS, which allowed us to execute
the contents of a UDP packet. Once the payload would execute, it would connect
to a CnC server and search for jpg files in the gest OS file system and send their
paths to the CnC server. The malware would then infect other VMs by sending
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Figure 4.9: Change in detection delay and false positives as the vaccine threshold
is changed. Y-axis on the right side is for the bars drawn from top to bottom.
the same UDP packet to other VMs with similar IP prefixes in the subnet. We
repeated this scenario numerous times with three different attack rates (5, 10 and
20 second wait times before sending the UDP packet to another VM mimicking a
slow, normal and fast malware respectively). We deployed a total of 15 VMs and
tested for three different vaccine thresholds (10, 40 and 70% of the total VMs)
while keeping the value of the anomaly window constant at either 5, 10 or 15 se-
conds for the duration of the experiment. As shown in Fig 4.10, smaller thresholds
and shorter monitoring cycles can thwart an attack very quickly preventing a large
part of the deployment from being infected. Larger thresholds and longer monito-
ring cycles, despite giving low false positives as shown previously, take longer to
detect the malware and allow it to infect more VMs in the community.
4.3.8 Anomaly Detection of Infected Workloads
To test the entire system as a whole and check the efficiency of malware de-
tection, we ran four versions of the MapReduce Image Processing workload side
by side. For the first case, we used the unmodified version of the workload out
of the box however, for the remaining three cases we infected the workload with
a particular type of malware, such as a Heartbleed vulnerability scanner (shown
in green), a Bitcoin mining trojan (shown in red) and finally a small stress tool
(shown in blue), which attempts to waste system resources needlessly. We then
profiled each of the four workloads for a total of 60 minutes observing the number
of sequences generated over 10 minute intervals by each workload individually.
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Figure 4.10: Vaccine threshold and monitoring window effect the rate at which
the vaccine is generated, which in turn prevents malware from spreading to other
VMs/containers.
ted substantially more sequences as opposed to the normal version, with the stress
tool generating the highest number of additional tuples followed by the Bitcoin
miner and the Heartbleed scanner coming in at last. These additional sequences
are successfully flagged by the anomaly detection mechanism and passed onwards
for malware analysis.
4.3.9 Overhead of HPC Monitoring plus Syscall Monitoring
Since we propose syscall monitoring in conjunction with HPC monitoring (see
Section 5) in this thesis, we demonstrate the feasibility of both approahces wor-
king in tandem. We ran both systems together and noted the job completion ti-
mes for various cloud-representative workloads. Since the Perf tool allows us to
monitor HPCs as well, this turned out to be a straightforward extension with nu-
merous benefits. As shown in Figure 4.12, the added instrumentation overhead,
resulting from HPC monitoring, is affordable for most applications and hence, the
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Figure 4.11: Demonstrating the additional syscalls generated by infected












































Figure 4.12: Overhead of Hardware Performance Counter monitoring in
combination with syscall monitoring as opposed to only syscall monitoring.
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CHAPTER 5: FINE-GRAINED TENANT MONITORING USING
MICRO-ARCHITECTURAL PATTERNS (MINEGUARD)
We now discuss the second component of the abuse prevention toolkit, which
is hardware-assisted profiling via HPC monitoring particularly in the context of
secretive cryptomining. The main goal is detect any mining related activity in real-
time without incurring any noticeable overhead on the tenants’ VMs. In order to
achieve this, we resort to hardware assisted profiling on each VM using Hardware
Performance Counters (HPCs) that demonstrably have very little overhead and
can be measured for each VM individually without any invasive “hooking” or
VMI. A classifier is used to detect if mining is happening or not and the VMs
are immediately flagged and the vendor is alerted. Below, we start off with some
background and overview of this work:
5.1 MOTIVATION AND OVERVIEW
As mentioned before, covert and cleverly concealed mining operations are a
financial concern for cloud vendors due to numerous reasons. They waste valu-
able resources and drive cooling and power costs up. Hence, it is imperative for
the admin to detect and thwart any covert mining deployments in real-time before
different losses stack up. One way out for vendors is to simply charge customers
for their mining, however, mining without specialized hardware on clouds is no
longer profitable [24, 12] (not even on GPU instances [12]) and hence, the only
time mining is done on clouds is when the VM has been compromised or the ac-
count has been hijacked and the attacker deploys new VMs dedicated to mining.
In either case, the customer refuses to pay and the vendor has to incur the losses
instead of generating revenue from the allocated resources. Hence, the only viable
option left is to prevent this covert mining from taking place altogether. However,
given the current state of defenses, neither the user nor the vendor can thwart this
nuisance. Cloud users have no way of stopping this abuse because of their loca-
tion in the software stack and consequently their limited ability to get “under” the
attacker (become more privileged). When attackers compromise users’ accounts,
they either get root access to the VMs and can turn off any antivirus designed to
detect mining Trojans and viruses or, in the case of non-root infiltrations, evade
these checking mechanisms using rootkits etc. Furthermore, antiviruses would
not be a concern for attackers using freemium/free tier resources or using enter-
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prise resources as they are the “legitimate” administrators of the deployment. Any
mitigation mechanism that can effectively thwart this abuse, therefore, has to be
rooted into the layer below the VM i.e., the hypervisor, and has to be managed by
the vendor or admin.
However, vendors also struggle to deal with such abuse. Current mitigation
mechanisms available to the vendors are ill-equipped to deal with abuse proacti-
vely. Most rely on the customer to make sure their instances don’t get compro-
mised (particularly in the IaaS model) and consequently abused. Some on the
other hand, resort to post-abuse forensics tools, which cannot prevent losses up
front. Additionally, vendors tend to focus more on incoming attacks as opposed
to outbound attacks originating from within their infrastructure. Vendors are also
reluctant “peaking” into customers’ VMs (e.g., by analyzing memory dumps), as
they run the risk of compromising the confidentiality and privacy of sensitive user
data and computations.
We present MineGuard, a simple hypervisor tool based on hardware-assisted
behavioral monitoring, which accurately detects the signature of a miner. Specifi-
cally, our system uses HPCs, a set of special-purpose registers built into modern
processors, to accurately track low-level mining operations or events within the
CPU and GPU with minimal overhead. This gives MineGuard the ability to accu-
rately detect, in real-time, if a VM is trying to mine for some cryptocurrency,
without incurring any substantial slowdown (< 0.01%). MineGuard is built on
the observation that for attackers to mine for any cryptocurrency, they will have to
repeatedly run the core Proof-of-Work (PoW) algorithm that the currency is based
on (such as SHA-256 [95] for BitCoin and Scrypt [15] for LiteCoin) millions of
times at the very least. Such repeated runs would substantially influence the count
of certain HPCs in a particular way which we can detect using a runtime checker.
We empirically demonstrate very high detection rates (≈99.7%), negligible false
positives (< 0.25%) and false negatives (< 0.30%). Furthermore, our system does
not modify any hypervisor code and leverages commonly available tools such as
perf [105], thus, making it easy to deploy and use in cloud and enterprise environ-
ments. Whether attackers use free resources or spin-up mining VMs maliciously,
they cannot deceive MineGuard as 1) it attempts to catch the inherent mining be-
havior that any miner must adhere to if it is to mine for a particular coin and 2) it
is more privileged than a VM and hence cannot be turned off or bypassed.
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Key Contributions:
• We perform a first-of-its-kind comprehensive study to explore the beha-
vior of cryptocurrency mining focusing on micro-architectural execution
patterns. Specifically, 1) we show that CPU/GPU signatures of mining and
non-mining applications differ substantially. 2) Different implementations
of the same coin exhibit similar signatures due to the same underlying PoW
algorithm, meaning that mining should be detected by profiling an algorithm
instead of the executing binaries (to beat polymorphic malware). 3) Sur-
prisingly, profiles of various coins exhibit overlapping signatures, despite
having different PoW algorithms.
• While prior work has demonstrated the use of HPCs for malware detection,
its utility and feasibility in a virtualized context has largely been ignored.
We characterize the noise that is introduced into each HPC value individu-
ally due to virtualization; and show the best-fit distribution for this noise in
each case. Our findings indicate that certain counters have a very pronoun-
ced noise-distribution, which can be used to error-correct the signatures. In
contrast, some HPCs show negligible effects of noise. To incorporate this
noise into our behavior profiles we develop a step-by-step signature crea-
tion process that captures an evolving profile of mining malware in increa-
singly noisier environments. This makes our signatures robust and allows
MineGuard to successfully flag mining malware even if an adversary acti-
vely tries to evade detection, as we show, by manipulating counter values
selectively.
• We build a user space tool, MineGuard, that can run on top of any hyper-
visor or host OS and perform real-time detection. MineGuard has a negli-
gible overhead, a small size footprint, is hard to evade, and cannot be com-
promised by malicious VMs. We have made the source code of MineGuard
along with our training and testing data publicly available for the benefit of
the community. Our tool can be readily used to classify any OS process or
VM instance and can serve as a useful addition to commonly used cloud
security toolboxes. Additionally, if trained on various malware profiles, we
believe MineGuard can be extended for generic malware detection with no
modification needed to the source code.
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5.2 HARDWARE PERFORMANCE COUNTERS (HPCS)
Past work has shown the effectiveness of hardware-based monitoring for mal-
ware detection[32, 23, 145, 156, 162, 144] using architectural and microarchi-
tectural execution patterns. The approach is predominantly characterized by an
extremely low performance overhead making it ideal for real-time monitoring on
latency sensitive systems. We build upon these past works and present the design
of a system based on Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) for detecting mi-
ning behavior on clouds/enterprises. HPCs are a set of special purpose registers
internal to the processor that record and represent the runtime behavior and cha-
racteristics of the programs being executed. Common examples include counts
of page faults, executed instructions, cache misses etc. Though developed to aid
application developers in fine-tuning their code, HPCs can also be used for beha-
vior profiling without directly looking at code and data. Other than the fact that
HPCs are extremely fast, their choice as the main detection metric is based on the
following insights.
First, miner need to run the core PoW algorithm of a coin repeatedly, millions
of times. If an algorithm A alters a few specific HPCs, say counters X, Y and Z, as
part of the main hashing operations, then the values for these three counters should
dwarf counts of all other (relatively under utilized) HPCs given that algorithm
A has to run millions of times. This implies that a very strong signature can
be constructed based on the relevant counters of a particular algorithm, such as
SHA-256 [95], Scrypt [15] or CryptoNight [28]. If an adversary tries to stay
under the radar by mining conservatively, then the adversary will not be able to
make any meaningful profit due to poor hash rates. Also, since the processor will
not be working at 100% utilization, it will neither increase power usage nor will
it increase cooling costs, making mining less of a nuisance for cloud vendors.
Second, any computation can only ever add to the values of HPCs and has no
way of reducing counter values, as opposed to software-based defenses, which
the attacker can subvert and alter. Hence, if an adversary mines for a coin, he will
have no way of reducing counter values to avoid detection, and will be flagged
inevitably. An adversary however, can try and neutralize the signature by incre-
asing the values of other HPCs not associated with the PoW algorithm. But to
do so successfully, the adversary has to overcome two hard challenges. First and
foremost, he has to figure out a computation that only affects HPCs other than the
ones related to the mining algorithm. In other words, there can be no overlap in
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the counters altered by the miner and the computation in question. Otherwise, the
signature of the miner will only be bolstered further. Second, and more impor-
tantly, he has to run the secondary computation millions of times so that counter
values are approximately equalized. However, the extra load on the system would
greatly diminish the hash rate of the miner, reducing his profits and making mining
a futile effort.
Third, HPCs are low-level registers and can be directly accessed by the hyper-
visor, requiring no modifications to the guest OS or applications. Furthermore, an
adversary that manages to compromise a VM, even with root access, will not be
able to falsify the values of the HPCs as the hardware does not allow this.
Lastly, HPCs have very low overhead [32] and can be accessed with high fre-
quencies without burdening the executing application.
5.3 BUILDING STRONG SIGNATURES
As a first step, strong and vivid mining signatures are needed to perform robust
detection. We explain the process step-by-step below.
5.3.1 Signature Creation
To incorporate the noise introduced by virtualization, we use a three-phased
approach to creating accurate and precise mining signatures for both CPUs and
GPUs. In the first phase, we run miners for various coins (in a non-virtualized
environment) and profile only the mining processes using perf [105] with a sam-
pling rate of 2 seconds (empirically chosen to give decent results). This gave us
noise-free process-level HPC-based signatures for numerous coins. For GPUs we
used nvprof [16]. The signature that we obtain during this phase is cleaned so
that the bootstrapping code of the miner is not considered and only the signa-
ture for the core PoW algorithm is captured. We call this signature the OS-level
signature.
In the second phase, we run miners inside VMs to cater to noise that is induced
by executing in a virtualized environment. No additional processes are run on the
VMs other than the default OS ones and our cryptominers, giving us pure VM-
level signatures. This phase corresponds to a scenario in which an attacker uses
dedicated VM instances for mining coins.
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Finally, in the last phase, we perform mining inside VMs that are already run-
ning other jobs and processes. This allows us to capture signatures in the presence
of maximum noise. We repeat our experiments for various popular and com-
mon cloud workloads running in parallel with a cryptocurrency miner. Signatures
generated during this phase are called VM-Interference signatures. The aforemen-
tioned scheme, explicitly captures the effects of virtualization-induced noise and
workload-induced noise both of which are a must for efficient detection of mining
activity.
5.3.2 Signature Database
MineGuard’s signature database, which we use to train the classifier, is very
small in size for numerous reasons. First, unlike generic malware, miners have to
stick to a core PoW algorithm. Whether the miner is polymorphic, metamorphic
or heavily obfuscated, the core algorithm, which we profile in our system, remains
the same. Since there are a finite number of coins, and consequently a limited
number of proof-of-work algorithms, added to the fact that there is no such thing
as a zero-day coin, our resulting signatures are few in number (<100). This makes
our signature database small. However, since each signature in the database is
distinct and prominent compared to other common cloud workloads, as shown in
Section 5.6, the classifier is still able to build its inner models successfully.
5.4 DESIGN OF MINEGUARD
The design of MineGuard was influenced by the following observations: First,
unlike generic malware that can exploit users in novel ways, miners have to stick
to the core PoW algorithm on which a cryptocurrency is based. This means that
if a signature is built specifically for the algorithm, various implementations, even
polymorphic and metamorphic ones, would be detectable. Second, detection has
to be performed in a manner oblivious to the VM so that a malicious party cannot
identify if they are being profiled or not, lest they start behaving differently. In ad-
dition, if a malicious entity does start behaving differently to cover up its tracks, it
should incur a massive penalty, thereby defeating the whole purpose of the attack.
Third, the detection mechanism has to be more privileged than the mining entity
for obvious reasons. Finally, given the massive scale of clouds, the mechanism













Figure 5.1: Inner components of a MineGuard instance.
Given these stringent requirements, a hardware-assisted mechanism that can be
executed on the host OS or the hypervisor emerged as the only logical candidate.
As shown in Figure 5.1, MineGuard comprises of three components: A Profiler,
a Detection Agent, and a Mitigation Agent. These three components run on each
server in the cloud on top of the host or the hypervisor.
The Profiler instruments each VM in real-time by polling the HPCs with a 2
second interval. The interval length is an adjustable metric, as MineGuard can
use any user-defined sampling frequency to increase the accuracy even further.
However, since mining is a long-term activity usually carried out for several hours
at the very least (as opposed to short-term malware) we can easily afford to uti-
lize large sampling intervals. This has the benefit of minimizing MineGuard’s
resource usage and does not effect the quality of the signature giving highly accu-
rate detection rates as shown in Section 5.6. Furthermore, long intervals before




















Figure 5.2: Overview of MineGuard. Sequentially: MineGuard checks for
current HPC values against the classifier. If a match occurs, it discovers all other
VMs of the tenant and shuts down/suspends these VMs if they are also found
mining.
their VMs are profiled less often.
The Detection Agent runs the current HPC values against a classifier trained to
detect mining behavior. If the classifier outputs a positive match, the Detection
Agent flags the VM. Once a VM is flagged, the Mitigation Agent suspends it
temporarily and determines the location of all VMs belonging to that tenant by
contacting the cloud orchestrator as shown in Figure 5.2. All of the tenant’s VM
are then put to further screening by the Detection Agents on their corresponding
servers. If more matches occur in this phase, the Mitigation Agents shut down
those suspicious VMs as well.
5.5 METHODOLOGY
Before we jump into the results, we explain our prototype implementation and
test environment, and present details of the cryptocurrencies, miners and bench-
marks we used for testing and evaluation.
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5.5.1 MineGuard Implementation
We implemented MineGuard in userspace using a combination of C++, Python
and Bash. We used C++ for the signature creation and detection modules, and
Bash and Python scripts for profiling VMs and collecting and organizing data.
We used an open source random forest library [108] for the bagged decision tree
implementation, and perf/perf−kvm [105] and nvprof [16] for CPU and GPU
profiling, respectively. Upon deployment, a driver script samples any given pro-
cess (application/miner/VM) for 2 seconds (equivalent to one test vector), formats
the test vector and passes it to the predict module to classify the process. Exclu-
ding the random forest library, the entire MineGuard infrastructure only requires
282 lines of code. We have also made the source code publicly available.
5.5.2 Testbed
All experiments were performed on a machine with an Intel Core-i7 2600K pro-
cessor (Sandy Bridge), an NVIDIA GTX 960 GPU (Maxwell) and 8 GB of DDR3
RAM. We ran Linux 3.16.0-44 for both desktop (non-virtualized) and server (vir-
tualized) environments. For collecting CPU-based training data, each application
was profiled for 20 seconds, with one sample being collected every 2 seconds,
for a total of 10 samples per application and miner. This provided ample data for
high accuracy classification with negligible overhead (discussed in Section5.6).
For GPU-based training data, samples were only collected once at the end of a
120 second sampling window - unlike perf, nvprof does not allow periodic sam-
pling of data.
5.5.3 Cryptocurrencies and Miners
Other than Bitcoin, the seven additional cryptocurrencies listed in Table 5.1 are
still actively mined using CPUs and GPUs, and hence together comprise a rea-
listic group for mining in the cloud. Furthermore, the currencies were chosen to
evaluate a variety of mining algorithms and provide maximum coverage across
the entire algorithm-space for mining-related PoW algorithms. The coins were
also chosen to represent a large fraction of the market cap for mine-able coins
(excluding Ripple, which cannot be mined, or coins with similar PoW algorithms,
like Monero which is based on the same algorithm as Bytecoin). To mine these
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Bytecoin CryptoNight cpuminer-multi-windows ccMiner-cryptonight-0.17
Dash X11 cpuminer-multi-windows ccMiner-1.6.6-tpruvot
Litecoin Scrypt cpuminer-multi-windows cudaminer-2014-02-28
Quarkcoin BLAKE, Blue Midnight Wish,
Gr∅stl, JH, SHA-3 and Skein
cpuminer-multi-windows ccMiner-1.6.6-tpruvot




Zcash Equihash nheqminer-0.5c nheqminer-0.5c
Table 5.1: List of cryptocoins used in this work along with their PoW algorithms
and corresponding CPU/GPU miners.
coins, we used cryptominers that were open-source and readily available online.
Table 5.1 lists the cryptominers and mining algorithms for each of the cryptocur-
rencies used. Each miner was run using as many cores as available on the test
system (8 cores for both the non-virtualized and virtualized environment) and pu-
blic mining pools were used to mine coins. Using public pools ensured that our
signature also incorporated the I/O aspects of miners, in addition to the dominant
compute aspects. Finally, each miner was profiled in three different operating
environments:
• OS (running standalone in a host OS)
• VM (running standalone in a guest OS)
• VM+Int (running simultaneously with interfering applications in a guest
OS).
5.5.4 Benchmarks and Cloud Workloads
To obtain signatures for non-mining applications, we chose various workloads
from representative benchmark suites like CloudSuite (v3.0) [39], SPEC 2006[124],
Rodinia [21] and Parboil [125]. The benchmarks were chosen to cover a wide vari-
ety of domains, such as Hadoop workloads, scientific computing, AI simulations,
data mining, graph analytics, web searching etc.; and a wide variety of workload
characteristics such as compute and memory intensity, branch and cache behavior,
and latency vs. throughput sensitivity. Furthermore, our mix of benchmarks con-
49
sisted of both single-threaded and multi-threaded applications. We tested a total
of 39 applications which we feel are representative of a real-world cloud setting.
5.6 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
In this section we show empirical results from MineGuard, and present a dis-
cussion on various aspects and limitations of our system. Before moving onto the
first set of results, we discuss the empirical overhead of our HPC-based appro-
ach. Prior work has shown in detail that the overhead of sampling counters, even
in microsecond intervals (much more fine-grained compared to our approach),
is negligible [117, 32]. We observed very similar results and got infinitesimally
small values (<0.01%) for various polling intervals hence, we do not present re-
sults for the overhead incurred due to space limitations and instead focus on other
details surrounding MineGuard.
5.6.1 Uniqueness of GPU Mining Signatures
As explained above, MineGuard uses HPC-based signatures to detect miners
in real time. We justify our choice of HPCs by demonstrating the uniqueness of
mining behavior on GPU instances compared to other common and popular GPU-
based workloads. Figure 5.3 presents this comparison between mining software
and some popular and common GPU workloads taken from the Rodinia [21] and
Parboil [125] benchmark suites. The figure shows the behavior of four different
profiling metrics across four miners and six applications. We ran these experi-
ments for several other benchmarks from the aforementioned benchmark suites
and found consistent results. However, those results have been omitted for bre-
vity. We make the following observations from our GPU results:
1. Miners have significantly less core occupancy (number of actual threads
out of maximum possible threads) than non-mining applications. This is
due to the fact that, in general, it is a good practice to run as many threads
as optimally possible on a GPU core, and therefore non-mining applications
tend to have high a core occupancy. Miners, on the other hand, also optimize
for memory per warp (the basic unit of execution in NVIDIA GPUs), and
aim to avoid creating bottlenecks in the memory system. Consequently,

































Local Memory Load Throughput (GB/s)
Figure 5.3: Difference in behavior of GPU miners and GPU applications. Miners
are shown in red; applications are shown in blue.
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2. Even though miners have low core occupancy, they have extremely high
average Instructions Per Cycle (IPC). As miners have a high compute to
memory ratio, they experience minimal stalls and have a high IPC. Non-
mining applications are more balanced in terms of compute and memory,
and are thus unable to achieve such high IPC numbers because memory
access stalls impose a limit on the maximum achievable parallelism.
3. The biggest difference between miners and non-mining applications is their
usage of local memory. Local memory in NVIDIA GPUs is used for re-
gister spilling and per-thread local data. However, despite its name, local
memory physically resides in the main memory of the GPU and as such it
is not as fast as scratchpads or texture caches. As a result, GPU application
programmers tune their code to minimize local memory usage as much as
possible. As can be seen in Figure 5.3, the six different non-mining applica-
tions have in fact no local memory usage (an exception is MRI, which does
use local memory but does so minimally). Miners, in stark contrast, exhibit
high usage of local memory. This is a consequence of the fact that mining
algorithms require a significant number of registers and this in turn results
in a significant number of register spills (note: the high register usage of
these algorithms also contributes to the low core occupancy).
4. Finally, Figure 5.3 shows that miners utilize the single-precision functional
units (SP FU) of the GPU cores more than non-mining applications do.
This, again, is due to the inherent nature of mining - there is a lot of single-
precision arithmetic (i.e. hashing) which stresses the integer pipeline of the
GPU.
To summarize, there is a marked difference between the performance counter
profiles of GPU miners and typical GPU applications. It is precisely these dif-
ferences that our classification algorithm relies upon to detect miners with high
accuracy.
5.6.2 Uniqueness of CPU Mining Signatures
As with GPU-based miners, we collected HPC-based signatures for CPU-based
miners as well. These signatures were then compared to common CPU-based
workloads from Hadoop, CloudSuite and the SPEC2006 benchmark suite to dis-
tinguish CPU miners from non-mining applications. The unique and distinct cha-
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racteristics of CPU-based miners, similar to their GPU counterparts, can be seen
in Figure 5.4. The figure shows four different subgraphs, one each for a given
HPC. Each subgraph shows a live-trace of a HPC’s value during the execution of
a CPU-based miner and four non-mining applications; namely data caching (me-
mcached server), AI (game of Go), H264 (hardware video encoding) and NAMD
(molecular dynamics). The results from other benchmarks have been omitted for
clarity.
Across all four graphs, the mining signature stands out. Since miners repeatedly
run a small set of computations over and over again for millions of times, their
resource usage is consistent throughout their execution. In other words, miners
generally do not exhibit irregular phases as most common applications do. Rather,
miners possess regular and structured phases. This consistency in signature is
represented by a step function like recurring pattern in all four graphs (red line)1.
The step functions are a consequence of the fact that the miner’s core algorithm is
composed of stages of varying computation diversity.
On the other hand, non-mining applications and workloads have phases that are
vastly different. While the phases are, like miners, repeated in regular intervals,
the behavior of each phase is much more irregular and possesses a high degree
of variance (a finding consistent with prior research [32]). These patterns are
particularly visible for H264 (black line). For example, the L1 load and L1 store
curves of H264 are rhythmic but irregular, and, in fact, also correlated - it can be
seen that troughs in load count correspond to peaks in store count.
Another interesting observation that can be made is that for the Litecoin miner,
the curves for each of the four HPCs closely follow each other - an increase in
one is accompanied by an increase in the other. However, for any given non-
mining application, barring data caching, the curves for each of the four HPCs
exhibit markedly different patterns; e.g. for NAMD (green line), the curve for
branch misses is extremely different than the curve for L1 stores. Data caching
is different than other applications in this regard and is more similar to the miner,
but it must be noted that this is the exception and not the rule.
All in all, we take away the following insight from these results: CPU-miners
exhibit a unique HPC-based signature and this signature can be effectively levera-
ged to detect virtual machines that are performing cryptocurrency mining.
1Although branch misses seem to be constant for the miner, in reality they also possess the


















































































































































































































































































































































Miner Data Caching AI H264 NAMD
Figure 5.4: Difference in behavior of a Litecoin CPU miner and four
representative CPU applications. The x-axis shows time in increments of 100












































































































Figure 5.5: Similarity in behavior of three different mining softwares mining
Bitcoin. The x-axis shows time in increments of 100 milliseconds.
5.6.3 Homogeneity of Mining Signatures
Hackers usually employ various techniques and mechanisms to bypass detection
mechanisms. They use polymorphic, metamorphic and obfuscated malware to
fool anti-virus softwares and runtime checkers by completely overhauling their
codebase. To prove the futility of these techniques against MineGuard, we de-
monstrate how three completely different miner implementations that are mining
the same coin still exhibit the same HPC-based signature. Figure 5.5 shows four
graphs, one per HPC, for three miners all mining for Bitcoin. The implementa-
tion of these miners is quite different from one another, however, the graphs all
show similar HPC patterns, thereby backing our claim that the mining signature
is consistent across different implementations. The reason behind this, as mentio-
ned previously, is that at their core, all miners have to abide by a fixed algorithm
(such as SHA-256 for Bitcoin, Scrypt for Litecoin, etc.) if they are to mine and
make money. Not only does this limit the amount of variability that can be affor-
ded by different implementations, but since the algorithm (hashes) is run millions
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of times, it dwarfs any differences that are present in polymorphic or metamor-
phic versions of the mining malware. Consequently, the resulting signatures only
have minor variations from miner to miner. These variations can manifest in the
following ways:
1. Phase shifts. The frontend stalls and L1 loads of all three miner implemen-
tations are similar in magnitude and shape, but are offset from each other
by a small time delta.
2. Differences in magnitude. For L1 stores, CPUminer has a larger magni-
tude than BFGminer and CGminer, albeit with clearly the same pattern.
3. Differences in curve shape. For branch misses, BFGminer and CGminer
still possess a similar signature, but CPUminer differs from both of them.
However, such drastic changes are rare, do not impact all HPCs (branch mis-
ses reflect control flow behavior, which is more prone to change than, say,
memory access behavior as shown by Figure 5.5), and most importantly, do
not appreciably impact miner detection accuracy.
Overall, HPC-based signatures of different miner implementations do not dif-
fer considerably, hence creating a uniformity that can be effectively exploited by
MineGuard during its detection phase.
5.6.4 Effects of Virtualization
So far, we have discussed the signatures of miners and various other applicati-
ons that were obtained in a non-virtualized environment (OS). Although these sig-
natures aptly present the similarities and differences between various miners and
non-mining applications, they do not account for “VM noise” that would naturally
be added when the aforementioned softwares are executed in a virtualized envi-
ronment (guest OS) and profiled from the hypervisor. Since monitoring virtual
machines is the primary role of MineGuard, we next study the effect of obtaining
signatures in a VM. Figure 5.6 shows the signatures of two HPCs when various
applications and miners are run in a VM. As can be seen from Figure 5.6a, the sig-
nature of different applications retains the same pattern as in an OS (Figure 5.4).
However, the curves have become more jagged and noisy as the system processes














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.6: Effect of VM noise on miner and application signatures. The x-axis
shows time in increments of 100 milliseconds. Note that (A) shows a smaller
time window than (B) and (C). (A) Signatures of applications running in a VM.
(B) Signatures of different Bitcoin miners running in a VM. (C) Signature of a
Litecoin miner when running simultaneously with different background
applications. LC is Litecoin, DC is data caching, DS is data serving, WS is web
serving.
degradation of the signature. For example, the peaks and troughs of H264’s sig-
nature can still be clearly seen. Figure 5.6b shows that the same result holds for
different miner implementations as well. The distinct step functions of the miners
observed in Figure 5.5 are still visible in Figure 5.6b. The slopes are unchanged
and the noisy plateaus are still flat, preserving the consistent behavior of miners.
Figure 5.6c shows the effect of running background applications on the signature
of a Litecoin miner. At this point, the signature is severely affected and changes
considerably. However, it is not hard to see that regardless of which background
application is chosen, the resulting signature still bears a resemblance to the step
functions of Figure 5.6b. While the smooth and consistent plateaus and slopes
have become extremely variant and wavy, they are still discernible by the classi-
fier. This is because the absolute value of a counter at the end of a polling interval,
which is roughly an amplified value of the base OS-Level signature, maintains cer-
tain characteristics of the unique pattern associated with mining. The classifier’s
inner model leverages these features and hence maintains high detection rates.
To conclude, interference from background applications and VM processes,
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which would be common when mining in a hijacked instance, will not adequately
distort the signature of a cryptocurrency, and MineGuard will therefore still be
able to perform accurate classification of mining software.
5.6.5 Evaluation Metrics
For evaluating our multi-class classification problem, we resorted to standard
metrics like—precision, recall, and F-score [122]. To compute such metrics we
need to first compute the true positive (TP ) rate for a given class, i.e., the number
of traces from the class that are classified correctly. Similarly, we need to com-
pute the false positive (FP ) and false negative (FN ) as the number of wrongly
accepted and wrongly rejected traces, respectively, for each class i (1 ≤ i ≤ n,
assuming there are a total of n classes). We then compute precision, recall, and
the F-score for each class using the following equations:
Precision, Pri = TPi/(TPi + FPi) (5.1)
Recall, Rei = TPi/(TPi + FNi) (5.2)
F-Score, Fi = (2× Pri ×Rei)/(Pri +Rei) (5.3)
The F-score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. It provides a good me-
asure of overall classification performance, since precision and recall represent a
trade-off: a more conservative classifier that rejects more instances will have hig-
her precision but lower recall, and vice-versa. To obtain the overall performance
of the system we compute average values in the following way:










Avg. F-Score, AvgF =




Given that we do not know the underlying distribution of the different features
for miners, we try out different non-parametric classifiers like k-Nearest Neighbor
(k-NN), Multiclass Decision Tree and Bagged Decision Trees (Matlab’s Treebag-
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ger model) [128]. We found that in general, ensemble-based approaches like Bag-
ged Decision Trees outperform the other classifiers2. During training, features
from all applications (i.e., both miners and non-miners) are used to train the clas-
sifier. In the test phase, the classifier predicts the most probable class for a given
(unseen) feature vector3. We found that the average time required to match a new
sample was ≈10ms, which further contributes to the low overhead feature of our
system.
5.6.7 Counter Selection
Although the graphs in Figures 5.4 and 5.5 visually and intuitively show the dif-
ferences in the counter values of miners and various applications, a more formal
approach to feature (counter) selection is required to determine the importance of
each counter, both by itself and in relation to other counters. When looking at each
counter individually, we use mutual information to determine its importance. The
mutual information (MI) of two random variables is a measure of the mutual de-
pendence between the two variables. More specifically, it quantifies the ”amount
of information” (in units such as bits or entropy) obtained about one random vari-
able (whether a signature belongs to a miner), through the other random variable
(the value of the HPC).
When looking at multiple features together, their importance as a whole is re-
presented by joint mutual information (JMI), a measure of the features’ combined
entropy. JMI can then be used to rank features from most important to least impor-
tant. In turn, the ranking can be used to choose the minimum number of features
that provide the best classification accuracy. Furthermore, profiling only the top
ranked features ensures that the overhead of MineGuard is minimized.
Table 5.2 lists the 26 different counters that were available on our system. To
obtain MI and JMI for each of these counters, we used FEAST, an open source
toolbox for feature selection algorithms [13]. The entropy (MI) of each of these
26 counters, both in an OS setting and in a VM setting, is shown in Figure 5.7. It
can be seen that features can be broadly divided into three categories. First, certain
features like 1 (clock cycles), 5 (bus cycles) and 8 (task clock) hold a significant
amount of information in both OS and VM environments. Second, features like 9
2This is somewhat expected as ensemble-based approaches use multiple learning algorithms
(commonly known as learners) to obtain a better predictive performance
3Unless otherwise stated, all experiments perform binary classification.
59
Name of Counter Counter ID OS Rank VM Rank Explanation
cycles 1 4 4 # of CPU clock cycles
instructions 2 6 6 # of executed instructions
branches 3 2 19 # of branch instructions
branch-misses 4 16 15 # of mispredicted branches
bus-cycles 5 8 1 # of useful bus cycles
stalled-cycles-frontend 6 1 5 # of stalled cycles in frontend of pipeline
stalled-cycles-backend 7 11 16 # of stalled cycles in backend of pipeline
task-clock 8 3 3 CPU time in milliseconds
page-faults 9 26 26 # of page faults
context-switches 10 24 24 # of context switches
cpu-migrations 11 25 25 # of migrations of profiled app
L1-dcache-loads 12 13 14 # of loads at L1 data cache
L1-dcache-load-misses 13 21 13 # of load misses at L1 data cache
L1-dcache-stores 14 7 7 # of stores at L1 data cache
L1-dcache-store-misses 15 14 8 # of store misses at L1 data cache
L1-dcache-prefetch-misses 16 18 17 # of misses at L1 cache that did not be-
nefit from prefetching
L1-icache-load-misses 17 15 10 # of instruction fetches missed in the L1
instruction cache
LLC-loads 18 12 11 # of loads at the Last Level Cache
LLC-stores 19 20 2 # of loads that missed in the data TLB
LLC-prefetches 20 9 20 # of stores that queried the data TLB
dTLB-loads 21 5 12 # of stores at the Last Level Cache
dTLB-load-misses 22 17 21 # of prefetches at the Last Level Cache
dTLB-stores 23 10 9 # of loads that queried the data TLB
dTLB-store-misses 24 23 22 # of stores that missed in the data TLB
iTLB-loads 25 19 23 # of instruction fetches that queried the
instruction TLB
iTLB-load-misses 26 22 18 # of instruction fetches that missed in the
instruction TLB
Table 5.2: List of HPCs considered for CPU-based signatures along with their
rank, as generated by the Joint Mutual Information Algorithm, and their
explanation.
(page faults), 10 (context switches) and 11 (CPU migrations) contribute negatively
to the classification process in both environments. Finally, the remaining features
provide varying amounts of information depending upon the environment. While
the general trends are the same in both environments, the differences between
the two graphs present the importance of performing feature selection for each
environment.
We do not present JMI explicitly, but rather present feature ranking results for
both OS and VM environments based on JMI in Table 5.2. Feature rankings mimic
the patterns observed in MI - certain features like 2 (instructions) do not change
rank while others like 19 (last level cache stores) change rank significantly. Anot-
her interesting observation is that system level events like page faults and context























Figure 5.7: The mutual information (entropy) contained within each hardware
performance counter for (a) an OS environment, (b) a VM environment.
res are ranked highly in both scenarios. In the Section 5.3, we use these results to
obtain the top N features that provide the highest classification accuracy.
5.6.8 Classification Accuracy
We now present results for MineGuard’s miner detection performance in two
different scenarios: a closed world setting in which every cryptocurrency is known
a priori, and an open world setting in which unseen cryptocurrencies exist.
A closed world setting is a scenario in which every cryptocurrency that Mine-
Guard can be requested to detect is a part of the signature database. The test sam-
ple may vary from the signatures stored in the database but as we have previously
shown, miners have unique and consistent signatures, increasing the likelihood
if the test sample is from a miner, it will be matched to a miner in the signature
database.
Table 5.3 shows the results for the closed world scenario. Since MineGuard has
been trained on every cryptocurrency in the test set, it achieves an exceptionally
high miner detection accuracy. It achieves 100% accuracy with a false positive
rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR) of 0% when classifying miners running
by themselves (OS and VM). This equates to perfect miner detection and implies
that if a known cryptocurrency is being mined in an OS or a VM, MineGuard will
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OS-Level 100.00% (0.00%) 0.00% (0.00%) 0.00% (0.00%)
VM-Level 100.00% (0.00%) 0.00% (0.00%) 0.00% (0.00%)
VM-Interference 99.90% (0.01%) 0.03% (0.02%) 0.00% (0.00%)
Table 5.3: Classification results for three different operating environments in a
closed world setting. Each result’s 95% confidence interval is written in brackets.
detect it every single time. When classifying miners running with other applicati-
ons, the average F-score drops to 99.9% and FPR increases to 0.03%, while FNR
remains at 0%. This is a result of MineGuard erroneously labeling a non-mining
application as a miner - but this is an infrequent occurrence (FPR of 0.03%).
It is evident that MineGuard is extremely apt at identifying miners running in
any operating environment. Even in the worse case of detecting miners running
with other applications in the background, it achieves an accuracy of 99.9% and a
FPR of 0.03% i.e. it only mistakenly flags a non-mining application 3 times out
of 10,000.
In contrast to a closed world setting, an open world setting may present a test
sample that belongs to a cryptocurrency whose signature does not exist in the
signature database. Such a scenario may arise when a new coin is invented and
the signature database has not yet been updated with its signature.
Table 5.4 shows the results for the open world scenario. While unable to
achieve perfect prediction as before, MineGuard still achieves an average F-score
of 96.31%, FPR of 2.05% and FNR of 3.91% in an OS environment. We see a
further detection degradation of 3.1% when we move to a VM however, the re-
sults are still comparable to the case of an OS although the FNR has increased.
Training on a miner with background noise (in the form of cloud workloads) hel-
ped reduce false negatives drastically, at the cost of a moderate increase in FPR
(last row of Table 5.4). An interesting point to note here is that the high FPR
predominantly comes from the infrequent classification of data analytics and data
caching as mining applications. This was also observed in the signatures presen-
ted in Figure 5.4. Overall, due to the similar nature of cryptocurrencies and the
dissimilarity of cryptocurrencies to other applications, MineGuard still achieves a
high classification accuracy of >96%. Therefore, MineGuard is adept at success-
fully catching miners even when the signature database lacks the exact signature.
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OS-Level 96.31% (0.61%) 2.05% (0.41%) 3.91% (1.31%)
VM-Level 93.21% (0.78%) 3.55% (0.60%) 8.59% (1.85%)
VM-Interference 96.37% (0.54%) 6.24% (0.92%) 1.25% (0.82%)
Table 5.4: Classification results for three different operating environments in an
open world setting. Each result’s 95% confidence interval is written in brackets.
While this is a promising result, we would like to point out that there is no concept
of a ”zero-day coin”. New cryptocurrencies do not present critical vulnerabilities
and if MineGuard is unable to detect a new cryptocurrency until its signature data-
base is updated, it is not a major concern. However, we believe that a classification
accuracy of >96% should alleviate any remaining consternations in that regard.
The results shown in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4, have been computed on a per
sample basis. This means that the classifier treats each 2 second sample of HPC
values as an independent test vector rather than labeling all samples collectively as
miner/non-miner. An alternate way is to use per application classification and treat
all samples collected from a running process as a single test vector. This approach
has the advantage that given the number of samples for a particular application,
the classification can be done using various ratios. For example, if 5 samples for
an application are available, if one is categorized as miner the entire application is
labeled as a miner. Similarly, we can use a scheme where all samples need to be
classified as a miner or use a simple majority rule (3 out of 5 classified as miner
then app is miner). In each case, the corresponding F-score, FPR and FNR would
be different. In Table 5.5, we present open world results for a simple majority
scheme (though other settings can also be used such as classification based on
33% match or 75% match etc.) using per application testing .
The results show that the F-score is still high. The corresponding FPRs for
our simple majority scheme are zero in all cases, which eliminates the primary
concern in our setting as legitimate tenants would rarely be flagged or shut down.
The reason for the 0% FPR is that previously, we were classifying each 2 second
HPC sample individually. In such a scenario there is a possibility that a particular
sample belonging to a non-miner exhibits HPC values matching those of a miner
(perhaps due to a hashing intensive phase in the execution). However, since now
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OS-Level 93.85% (2.68%) 0.0% (0.0%) 9.70% (3.77%)
VM-Level 91.67% (3.16%) 0.0% (0.0%) 16.33% (5.83%)
VM-Interference 96.32% (1.75%) 0.0% (0.0%) 7.99% (4.10%)
Table 5.5: Classification results for three different operating environments in a
open world setting when all samples are treated collectively (per application
processing).
we’re looking at all samples of a single application collectively, the chances of all
samples being hashing intensive (or even a majority of them) for a non-miner app
are rare and hence the 0% FPR.The corresponding FNRs are a bit high, however
this is less of a concern for the following reasons. First, since mining is commonly
a long-term activity the attacker will eventually get flagged in a subsequent scan
even if he evades the classifier once or twice. Second, if the attacker uses multiple
VMs to form a personal mining pool, then with high likelihood one of their VMs
will get flagged (even if other VMs successfully evade the classifier), which would
trigger MineGuard to immediately scan all other VMs that are part of the same
deployment again and if more VMs are caught, the cloud provider can do a more
comprehensive check of the entire deployment using VMI or other more invasive
tools.
Taken collectively, these results indicate that MineGuard is extremely adept at
identifying miners running in any operating environment. Even in the worse case
of detecting miners running in noisy environments, it achieves very high accuracy.
5.6.9 Effect of Signature Size
Figure 5.8 shows the relationship between the size of the signature i.e. the
number of top counters being used in the signature (based on the ranking obtained
shown in Table 5.2), and the accuracy of detection4 in a VM environment. The
insights upon which we build our signature, as mentioned in Section 5.4, lay the
foundation for a highly precise detection scheme. This fact can be deduced from
the observation that even when only 3 counters are used, we achieve an average
4These results in this section are for multi-class classification (type of miner and type of ap-






























Figure 5.8: Accuracy of miner classification in a VM environment, in terms of
(a) average F-score, (b) average false positive rate and average false negative
rate, as the number of features is increased.
F-score [122] of 91%, an average false positive rate (FPR) of 5.7% and an average
false negative rate (FNR) of just 1%. If we increase the size of the signature to
10 counters, the average F-score jumps to 97%, and FPR and FNR drop down to
2.2% and 0.3%, respectively. Using the top 22 features yields the highest F-score
of 98.9%, and FPR and FNR of 0.3% and 0.03%, respectively. Interestingly, the
last four features - context switches, instruction TLB loads, CPU migrations and
page faults - contribute negatively to classification accuracy and decrease F-score
by 0.3%, and increase FPR and FNR by 0.2% and 0.05%, respectively. However,
these differences are small and do not affect our overall results.
These findings greatly substantiate our claim that HPCs are an excellent candi-
date for signature creation and generate remarkably short (only 22 features) and
strong (98.9% accuracy) signatures.
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Figure 5.9: Degradation of mining hash rate as the number of masking threads is
increased. The hash rate falls consistently while the detection rate remains
constant throughout, with only a slight increase in false negatives as 8 threads are
used.
5.6.10 MineGuard Under an Active Adversary
In an attempt to throw off MineGuard, a clever attacker could selectively create
noise in the HPCs by running computations in parallel that influence counters not
involved in mining. This would artificially inflate the values and modify patterns
of certain HPCs that are irrelevant to the mining signature and appear as a benign
workload to the classifier. To check the effectiveness of this scheme we perfor-
med an experiment with Litecoin where we modified the miner’s code to run a
computation in parallel that predominantly affects the set of mining-orthogonal
counters (HPCs not showing significance use during mining). We measured how
increasing the number of threads for the extra computation negatively impacts the
total hash rate along with the corresponding reduction in MineGuard’s detection
accuracy. Figure 5.9 captures this relationship for 100 different runs of the afo-
rementioned experiment. As expected, increasing the number of threads for the
camouflaging computation severely degrades the hash rate (base hash rate is ap-
proximately 30 kH/s). However, it has very little impact on the detection rate
meaning that the exercise would not be of benefit to the attacker. Granted, the
experiment covers only a small subset of the overall computation space available
to the attacker, we still feel that the impact suffered by the hash rate will be much
more severe compared to the hit taken by the classifier in nearly all cases.
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CHAPTER 6: CYCLONE: THWARTING COVERT AND SIDE
CHANNELS VIA DYNAMIC REPOSITIONING OF ENTIRE
DEPLOYMENTS
Practical mitigation of abuse of networks and hosts resulting in covert and side
channels in the case of commercial clouds is a challenging problem and one that
cannot be completely eliminated. To this end, we proposed a moving target de-
fense approach, as mentioned in other works as well [91] and our own initial
work in this area [132]. However, we extended the aforementioned projects to
provide tenant-level mobility where by entire deployments, including VM pools
and virtual networks along with any middleboxes, can be migrated to new locati-
ons. Furthermore, we developed various algorithms with different characteristics
that allow vendors to choose specific candidates and migrate them to particular
locations to minimize information leakage. We also present the design of multiple
mitigation schemes that work for hosts, networks or entire deployments.
However, before we present our defense mechanisms, we first provide some
background knowledge on how these channels are setup.
6.1 ABUSE OF INFRASTRUCTURE FOR INFORMATION LEAKAGE
There are two primary types of information leakage channels in commercial
clouds today:
• Cross Virtual Machine Channels: These exist between two virtual ma-
chines that are coresident on the same physical server. The attacker needs
to abuse the host infrastructure to realize this kind of attacks. Information
flows from one VM to another via various types of shared media, such as
cache, system bus, shared memory etc.
• Cross Virtual Network Channel: These exist between two virtual net-
works that are sharing the underlying physical network. These are primarily
Inter-Packet Delay (IDP) channels resulting due to shared queues on links,
routers, switches, middleboxes etc. Hence, these fall into the category of
abuse of network infrastructure.
A large body of literature targets the former and we refer the interested reader
to these [155, 110, 106, 97]. However, in this thesis we focus on the abuse of
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networking infrastructure. Of course, the defenses we present are comprehensive
and apply to all types of abuse, whether at the host or network, however since we
discovered some Cross-VN Channels ourselves and analyzed them, we present
them in more detail below in order to come up with the most practical and efficient
defenses for them.
6.2 CHANNEL CONSTRUCTION FOR INFORMATION LEAKAGE
We first start by explaining how the simplest channel can be constructured.
Assume there are two virtual networks; the trusted network and the untrusted
network. Our scheme requires the existence of a party “inside” the trusted domain
to leak out information to recipients outside. We use the term insider to refer
to such a party, which could be for example a malware (which has infiltrated a
trusted machine) or a disgruntled employee that wishes to leak out information.
We refer to any other entity colluding with the insider (but not part of the trusted
network) as an outsider.
We start by proposing a unidirectional construction for the simplest case of
the channel where information can only flow in one direction, from the insider to
the outsider. We note however, that bidirectional channels can be established by
extending the same scheme and will be discussed later.
Shared Link L







Logically Isolated Network NT
Logically Isolated Network NU
Figure 6.1: Set up for the covert channel. Nodes from the Trusted and the
Untrusted Network sharing network resources.
68
6.2.1 Construction for Unidirectional Channel
Our channel is a timing-based, cross-Virtual Network (cross-VN) covert chan-
nel that relies on the underlying shared network resources in the data center to
transfer data between logically isolated virtual networks. We consider the sce-
nario where a switch or a shared network resource is handling traffic from two
different flows belonging to two different logical networks with software isolation
guarantees in place. We characterize these virtual networks in a manner such that
nodes from a particular virtual network can only route to nodes within that net-
work (as would be realized with, for example, VLAN-based isolation). In other
words inter-VN routing is prohibited. For simplicity both networks have two no-
des each as shown in Figure 6.1. Nodes T1 (insider) and T2 are part of a trusted
network Nt, which is separated logically from network Nu, which essentially be-
longs to another tenant located in the same data center. Nodes U1 and U2 (both
outsiders) are part of this other tenant’s virtual network. The two networks are
co-located in that they share the same network infrastructure, i.e., switch S1 and
S2 connected by a link L. A Additionally, consider two flows in the network such
that flow F1 is a flow from T1 to T2 and flow F2 is a flow from node U1 to U2. We
call F1 the insider flow and F2 the outsider flow. For simplicity, switch S1 can be
modeled as an infinite buffer server that is serving jobs from two separate clients.
In such a scenario, T1 will use the insider flow to induce delays in to the outsider
flow since both flows are sharing the underlying network. Node U2 can extract the
covert message by measuring the amount of latency experienced by its packets
belonging to the outsider flow. This key insight, displayed in Figure 6.2 can be
used by colluding nodes, on two different virtual networks to pass information
between the two logically separated entities. For instance, the insider can increase
or decrease its traffic through the shared link in order to signal a ‘1’ or a ‘0’ bit.
As a result, even when nodes are not allowed to route to each other directly, an
outsider, would still be able to infer the traffic pattern of the insider resulting in
information leakage from the trusted to the untrusted domain.
6.2.2 Bidirectional Channels
Thus far we have focused exclusively on unidirectional covert channels, as per-
formance and properties of the bidirectional case are very similar. We note that
establishing a bidirectional channel can provide more power to the adversary. For
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Receiver observes delays
Bursty Traffic (Signaling 0 or 1)
Sender sends without delays
Covert Channel
Figure 6.2: The insider (Infected Machine T1) encodes the covert messages in the
form of bursts. This in turn induces delays into the outsider flow observable by
the receiver (U2).
example, the outsider can provide control information back to the insider, impro-
ving transmission speed and error tolerance (as they can precisely indicate which
data blocks are lost due to transmission error, and request retransmission), and
potentially reduce data transmission requirements (as they can just request certain
blocks of interest, or perform interactive exploration of the private data). The con-
struction of the bidirectional channel is quite similar to the unidirectional version,
with the difference that now the system has four flows (2 insider flows and 2 out-
sider flows), 1 pair in each direction with each insider flow inducing delays into
the outsider flow.
6.2.3 Abusing Middleboxes
Middleboxes can be abused to launch colocation attacks [141]. These attacks
are designed to assist the attacker in achieving coresidency with a target and hence,
are fundamental to our study of covert and side channels arising from abuse of
networking infrastructure. For instance, AWS currently employs the flow hashing
algorithm in its Network Load Balancers (NLB) by using values from the header
to schedule flows onto paths. Similarly, the Classic Load Balancers (CLB) use
the round robin algorithm to divert the incoming connections onto various VMs
in the backend. All these algorithms can be abused by the attackers to repeatedly
cycle through all paths and all VMs behind a load balancer until coresidency is
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achieved. Techniques such as these, and others that fall under the umbrella of
“cloud cartography” [110], are cleverly used by attackers to leak information from
both unsuspecting and colluding tenants. Hence, the mitigation schemes presented
below need to handle this abuse of middlebox in order to successfully prevent
these covert and cleverly concealed channels.
6.3 MITIGATION SCHEMES
The proposed mitigation schemes are built on top of the following insight. Data
centers are typically over-provisioned in terms of the underlying network resour-
ces, such as links, switches, middleboxes etc. [47]. Similarly, providers have spare
capacity at the host level as well. Hence, we propose a moving target defense ap-
proach that dynamically reprovisions components of a deployment or the entire
deployment itself by leveraging the redundancy in the underlying resources. The
main goal behind our approach is to minimize coresidency between any given pair
of tenants. For instance, for network-based channels we develop a scheme that in-
volves dynamically migrating flows in order to reduce the amount of time spent
on the same underlying resource while minimizing modifications to the load ba-
lancing infrastructure. The basic idea is to select a candidate flow after it has been
scheduled on a particular link and migrate it to a different path dynamically and
repeatedly (if possible), ideally node-disjoint or at least edge-disjoint, based on
the characteristics of a flow or the current state of the resource being shared. It is
important to note here that reallocation of flows should not be done too quickly so
as to maintain stability of transmission. We explain various different mechanisms
that can be employed, in combination, depending on the circumstances. For in-
stance if a trustworthy tenant is scheduled alongside an untrusted tenant, the flows
of the untrusted tenant could be assigned a more aggressive hopping scheme. We
present some schemes for hopping and their performance in the section below:
6.3.1 Path Hopping
If multiple node-disjoint paths are available between the insider and outsider’s
flows, changing the path of either of the flows would eliminate the sharing and se-
verely limit the capacity of the channel. This “post-load balancing” migration of
the flow can be achieved with simple modifications to the network substrate. With
















a - Before Migration
b - After Migration
Figure 6.3: Complete node-disjoint path hopping is demonstrated. The flow is
migrated from the path A-S3-S4-B to a different path A-S1-S2-B.
entire virtual networks around. LIME[65] is one such example where overlay
networks are migrated to a distinct or partially distinct set of physical resources,
however LIME does not take into account entire deployments and leaves out cer-
tain components such as middleboxes. In order for the cloud provider to migrate
a flow, we first need to decide which flow to migrate (flow selection). We then
need to decide on a location where we move the flow to (flow placement) and
what type of migration we want to do (node-disjoint vs. edge-disjoint). We show
the operation in Figure 6.3. We present some simple schemes for both problems
below:
a) Flow Selection: The first problem when migrating is the following: Given
a set of flows with various properties, how to select the flow to migrate. Each
technique discussed below has an advantage and some defining characteristics.
• Similarity-Based Selection: SDNs give us the ability to query real time
traffic statistics from each switch. If two flows are found to be similar in
terms of their link utilization (or other such metrics), we simply swap them
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with each other so as to minimize the effect of hopping on the other flows.
If either of the swapped flows happens to be a participant in the covert or
channel channel, the channel will break down.
• Timed Selection: In this scheme we associate a timer with each flow and
whenever the timer expires we migrate the flow to another path. The pro-
vider can tweak the value of the timer allowing them to set a more aggres-
sive hopping policy vs. a conservative one. This would result in a flow
constantly moving around the data center as timers expire on different in-
stances. Hence, the cloud network will almost always have some migration
traffic.
• Random Selection: The system has a global timer and when the timer ex-
pires a (weighted) coin is flipped for each flow. If the coin lands on its head
then we migrate the flow, else we leave the flow as it is. This would mean
that when the global time expires roughly half the number of flows (assu-
ming the coin i fair) would be migrated to new destinations. As opposed
to the previous case, the network would not always have migration traffic
however, at set intervals there would be a spike resulting from the sudden
migration of all selected flows.
b) Flow Placement: Once a flow has been selected to migrate, the problem left
is to determine an ideal location to migrate the flow to. We consider this issue in
the following schemes:
• Random Placement: Select the destination path randomly from a set of
paths. For example the candidate path can be chosen from one of the
neighboring routers/switches or perhaps a different section of the topology
which has the same pod structure (in the case of Fat-Trees).
• Anti-Social or Least-Crowded Placement: Select the destination path that
is least crowded (in terms of the number of flows or the link utilization).
Such live migration also has the effect of alleviating congestion.
• Quickest Placement: Select the destination path that gives the least down-
time. This could be due to numerous reasons, such as the close physical
proximity of the destination location or availability of better or more advan-
ced quality resources (for example faster routers etc.).
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Similarly, many other schemes are available to the provider with each scheme
ideal for a certain set of constraints and optimization goals. A complete explora-
tion of all of these schemes is outside the scope of this thesis.
6.3.2 Location Hopping
The mitigation schemes described above also apply directly to cross-VM covert
and side channels [110, 155, 154, 106]. Migrating one of the VMs to a different
server would eliminate any sharing. We call this process “location hopping” and
all schemes mentioned in the previous section can be applied to the context of
VMs directly.
6.3.3 Middlebox Migration
Similarly, middleboxe sharing is also a cause for concern. Since cloud provi-
ders now routinely offer specialized nodes, designed for instantiating middlebox
components such as load balancers, it is important to minimize sharing of re-
sources across pairs of coresident tenants. Furthermore, middleboxes can also be
abused directly to aid with information-leakage channels, such as by repeatedly
cycling through all paths behind a load balancer employing round-robin schedu-
ling policy. This will allow the attacker to keeping probing on different paths until
coresidency is achieved with a target flow. Middlebox migration helps against
this abuse by migrating an the middlebox instance to a different middlebox-only
node (along with any associated state). However, it is important to note here that
typically middlebox migration entails migration of some other components of the
deployment as well, such as any associated flows and VMs being serviced by the
middelbox in question.
6.3.4 Deployment Hopping
Similar to path and location hopping, deployment hopping builds on the idea
of migration to minimize resource sharing. However, in this case entire tenant
deployments are migrated along with any and all middleboxes that are part of the
deployment. No prior work has addressed this issue and it is unclear what role






















a - Before Migration
b - After Migration
Figure 6.4: The overview of how a complete deployment is migrated from one
location in the data center to another. The example shown here is very simple. A
small tenant with three VMs and one load balancer in front is being migrated
from pod A to pod B. The color constraints have to be followed during
migration. Orange is for hosts and only VMs can occupy these nodes. Green is
for middleboxes (load balancers in this case) and only middleboxes can be
placed here. Finally, red is fro switches and routers.
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defenses that encompass all components of a deployment. Deployment hopping
can be seen in Figure 6.4.
6.4 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF THE MITIGATION SCHEMES
We analyze the performance of Timed Selection working in conjunction with
Random Placement for all hopping scenarios (i.e., path hopping, location hopping,
middlebox hopping and deployment hopping), using a Markov model. Consider
the simple case of two tenants, TA and TB. The Markov model that we are using
has two states i.e., shared and unshared. In the shared state, components of TA and
TB are overlapping or in other words, they are fully or partially coresident. For the
unshared case, the two tenants are disjoint, which means they are not sharing any
resources. Furthermore, for each tenant we analyze the middleboxes, the paths
and the servers it occupies or spans across. Hence, for TA we have the following:
MA = Number of middleboxes occupied by the deployment
SA = Number of disjoint servers occupied by the deployment
PA = Number of distinct paths occupied by the deployment
Similarly, we have the following for TB:
MB = Number of middleboxes occupied by the deployment
SB = Number of disjoint servers occupied by the deployment
PB = Number of distinct paths occupied by the deployment
Finally, let us assume that the total resources in the cloud (i.e.,the substrate) is
represented by the following:
M = Total number of middleboxes available for migration
P = Total number of paths available for migration
S = Total number of servers available for migration
Proceeding with this information, we can make Markov chains for each of the
cases below:
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Figure 6.5: The Markov chain for the path hopping case. The flow of Tenant TB
is being migrating under the Timed Selection and Random Placement model.
6.4.1 Markov Model for Path Hopping
In this scheme, the channel state may change whenever the timers associated
with either of the tenants’ flows fire. Suppose the current state is shared (one
flow from TA and one flow from TB are coresident), and the timer of the flow
belonging to TB fires, then the probability of this flow being allocated a different
path rather than staying on the one shared by the other flow is given by P−PA
P
(migrating to a path, which is not utilized by TA), transitioning from the shared
to the unshared state in the Markov model. The same transition probability holds
when the timers of both flows are fired. The Markov chain in Figure 6.5 illustrates
this state transition. Hence, for larger values of P (disjoint paths available for
migration) the system will have a higher likelihood to be in the unshared state,
which is the goal of the mitigation scheme.
6.4.2 Markov Model for Location and Middlebox Hopping
A similar argument can be made for the location hopping scenario. Here, a
VM may migrate whenever the timer associated with it fires. Again, suppose the
current state is shared (one VM from TA and one VM from TB are coresident),
and the timer of the VM belonging to TB fires. The probability of the VM being
migrated to a different server not utilized by the other tenant’s VMs is given by
S−SA
S
(i.e., migrating to a server, which is not utilized by TA), transitioning from
the shared to the unshared state in the Markov model. The same transition
probability holds when the timers of other VMs are fired. The Markov chain in
77
Figure 6.6: The Markov chain for the location hopping case. The VM of Tenant
TB is being migrating under the Timed Selection and Random Placement model.
Figure 6.7: The Markov chain for the middlebox hopping case. A middlebox of
Tenant TB is being migrating under the Timed Selection and Random Placement
model.
Figure 6.6 illustrates this state transition. Again, for larger values of S (which is
typically the case in commercial clouds today) the system will have a higher like-
lihood to be in the unshared state rather than the shared state where information
leakage channels are possible. The case of the middlebox hopping is very similar
and is depicted in Figure 6.7.
6.4.3 Markov Model for Deployment Hopping
The case when the entire deployment is being migrated is a bit more complex
compared to the previous cases. The transition probabilities are computed by ta-
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Figure 6.8: The Markov chain for the deployment hopping case. The complete
deployment of Tenant TB is being migrating under the Timed Selection and
Random Placement model.
king into account the fact that for two deployments to be completely disjoint none
of the components should be sharing any underlying resources. If a single server,
path or middlebox is shared, the system will continue to be in the shared state.
Assume the system to be currently in the shared state and the timer associated
with the entire deployment of TB fires, then for the system to transistion into the
unshared state the probability is given by the fraction shown in Figure 6.8. As
evident, this fraction is taking into account the fact that no component should be
coresident between the two tenants. Again, for larger values of S, M and P, the
system will stay in the unshared state with greater likelihood. The probabilistic
argument presented above, allows the readers to see how the proposed defenses
can mitigate information leakage channels without actually detecting them ma-
king the job of the cloud provider much easier.
6.5 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Having analyzed the performance of the proposed mitigation schemes via Mar-
kov chains, we now present a few results pertaining to the implementation of these
schemes on our in-house cloud-like testbed at the University of Illinois Urbana-
Champaign, known as OCEAN (for flow migration). Since full deployment hop-
ping is a bit more complicated, we set up a custom topology of three machines
with two separate networks, one for the control traffic (InfiniBand based) and one
























Figure 6.9: The custom topolgoy that we have used for our experiments. VM3 is
the sender VM and VM1 and VM2 are the receiving VMs. The Load Balancer is
running inside VM4. The controller machine is connected to the two machines
via Ethernet (data network). The two machines are also connected with each
other via InfiniBand (control network), which only allows the control traffic (or
the migration traffic) to pass through in order to speed up the migration.
ployment instantiated via OpenVirteX (OVX), which is a network hypervisor that
allows us to create virtual topologies on top of physical infrastructure. The deploy-
ment running on the first machine is then migrated to the second machine. The
controller software that governs the migration process, runs on the third machine
and is comprised of the OVX hypervisor, LIME (for virtual network migration)
and the Floodlight Controller. The topology and the setup of the machines can be
seen in Figure 6.9.
6.5.1 Hopping Results on the Custom Topology
We present three types of results in this section. First, we show how the mi-
gration of deployments impacts job completion times of running workloads at the
source node, the destination node and the migrating VM itself. Second, we show








































B) App Completion Time of the VM at Destination
A) App Completion Time of the VM at Source
Figure 6.10: Job completion times for the A) Source server, B) Destination
server and C) the Migrant VM.
hopping process. Finally, we show how the network utilization varies during the
process of migration.
Job Completion Times: As mentioned above, this experiment was designed to
test the effect of hopping or live migration on the workloads running in a data
center. To keep things simple, we chose a computationally intensive workload
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with a lot of matrix multiplication involved. Once the workloads were started,
we measured the delays in completion times across three types of nodes: 1) the
workloads running on the source node from where the VM will be migrated, 2) the
workloads running on the destination node to where the VM will be placed and 3)
the workloads running inside the VM being migrated (Migrant VM). Figure 6.10
captures the delays in job completion times across various types of nodes. In plot
A, it can be seen that as the VM is migrated from a node, the workloads running
on that node finish sooner. This is because the migrating VMs free up resources,
which can be acquired by other VMs instantiated on the server. Similarly, plot B
shows that the destination node experiences a slowdown resulting from increased
sharing of resources as the migrant VMs have to be allocated resources as well.
Finally, plot C shows the workloads running on the migrant VM itself. In our
experience, we have seen a slight degradation in performance. However, due to
efficient live migration techniques the downtimes tend to be minimal resulting in
manageable slowdowns if any.
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B) CPU Utilization (Clone)
%user
%user
Figure 6.11: As VMs start migrating, CPU usage goes down on the source and
we see a corresponding increase of CPU utilization at the destination
CPU Utilization Stats: Similar to job completion times, we also plotted the CPU
utilization across various nodes that were participating in the hopping process.
Figure 6.11 captures the increase/decrease of CPU utilization across servers as
the departing VMs free up resources and acquire them on the destination server.
Since VM migration is carried out iteratively and we have four VMs in the custom
topology (one sender, two receivers and one middlebox), S1, S2, S3 and S4 signal
the start of migration for the various VMs on the plot. Similarly, E1, E2, E3 and E4
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mark the points where VM1, VM2, VM3 and VM 4 finish migrating respectively.
The plot provides an insight into how migration of deployments affects resources,
such as processor or memory and how the give and take process would happen
across the data center without creating problems for the migrating tenants or the
background tenants.
A) Network Utilization (Source) - TCP
Time (s)
Time (s)







Figure 6.12: TCP connections initially stay inside a server. However, as the
migration starts happening we see TCP traffic going from one server to the other.
Upon completion, we stop seeing the traffic again as it stays inside the same
server
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Network Utilization Stats: Finally, we also wanted to see how deployment
migration would affect the bandwidth utilization. The goal of these experiments
is to make sure that there are no unseen consequences of migration and that the
resources freed up are roughly proportional to the resources acquired at the des-
tination so that an argument can be made on the sustainability of the mitigation
schemes. To this end, we monitored the bandwidth usage on the two aforementi-
oned networks i.e., the data network (Ethernet) and control network (InfiniBand).
Figure 6.12 captures the affects of hopping on the data network under on-going
TCP connections, where as Figure 6.13 illustrates what happens to the control
traffic as VMs, middleboxes and all network components are moved around and
repositioned. As evident, in both graphs traffic emerging from the sender initially
does not traverse the data network. However, as the receiver is migrated from ma-
chine one to machine two, the traffic can be clearly seen on the data network now.
Furthermore, the amount of outgoing traffic on server one is proportional to the
amount of incoming traffic on server two (which now houses the receiver). As the
iterations continue and the sending VM is also migrated, we again stop seeing the
TCP traffic on the data network. This is because KVM (which is the underlying
hypervisor in our implementation) uses a host-resident virtual switch to route pac-
kets from one VM to the other without traffic every exiting the machine. A similar
trend is witnessed on the IB network, which provides a separate channels for any
and all control traffic. The observations made for the data network can be applied
directly to the case of the control network and hence, we skip the explanation for
that here.
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A) Network Utilization (Source) – TCP IB
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Figure 6.13: InfiniBand is used for sending and receiving control information to
the VMs being migrated. As evident, there is some traffic during the migration
process that follows a systematic pattern repeating with each iteration.
6.5.2 Path Hopping on OCEAN
We implemented the schemes described above and show the performance of
Random Selection + Random Placement in Figure 6.14. The region where the
sharing took place can be seen in the start followed by three intervals of solitary
placement for both the insider and outsider flows (although we are only showing
the outsider flow here). We noticed downtimes on the orders of tens of milli-
seconds mostly to a couple hundred of milliseconds at times. Given these low
downtimes we believe that we can hop more frequently if a tenant reputation sy-
stem is in place and the tenant has a low reputation score. This would ensure that
the tenant’s flows keep moving around in the data center, which in turn would
induce an unstable covert channel (if the insider does manage to restart sharing
somehow).
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Peaks Showing Downtime During Migration
Figure 6.14: Random Selection + Random Placement Mitigation Scheme: The
graph clearly shows the regions where the flows are overlapping and the covert
channel is operational and how hopping reduces the bit rate. The three long
peaks are the downtimes we witnessed during the hopping.
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CHAPTER 7: REPMON: A TENANT REPUTATION SYSTEM FOR
CLOUDS
The final piece of the puzzle, for proactive abuse prevention in clouds is Rep-
Mon, an SDN-based behaviour analysis and monitoring architecture for cloud that
builds tenants reputations over time. The central idea is that a cloud vendor can
get a more comprehensive view of its tenants and the extent and nature of their
individual behavior by observing their network traffic and building a profile of the
past and current behavior of all tenants (via reputations). Fine-grained algorithmic
control of the data and control planes allows providers to rapidly deploy and ma-
nage tenant-specific network and security policies. RepMon implicitly explores an
incentive-based model where good behavior gets rewarded and misbehavior can
result in a degraded quality of service to encourage good behavior from the cus-
tomers. The actual policies could range from preferential QoS for good tenants,
quarantine of misbehaving tenants, re-tooling the firewall rules to drop offending
traffic or simply informing human administrators.
RepMon comprises multiple components working in tandem to build the over-
all tenant reputations. To profile the current network behavior of tenants, RepMon
comprises an SDN-based Traffic Sampling System (Component 1). To determine
if the observed behavior is anomalous/malicious it has a Behavior Analysis Sy-
stem (Component 2). To respond to an incident in the most informed and appro-
priate way, the Analysis System in turn talks to the Tenant Reputation System
(Component 3), which logs the past behavior and history of each tenant. Based on
the current updated reputations, the Policy Enforcement System (Component 4),
modifies the per tenant policies to adapt to changes in observed behavior. Each of
these components is deployed as a tenant in the cloud, which makes them scalable
and fault tolerant.
7.1 COMPONENT 1: FAST AND ADAPTIVE TRAFFIC SAMPLING
SYSTEM
Researchers have proposed different methods of sampling for SDN networks [94,
126, 161] usually via indirect methods (such as by dropping rules after a certain
amounts of packets have passed so that the next packet is forwarded to the control-
ler resulting in sampling). However, since our proposed solution is for the cloud
provider, we assume they can make modifications to the underlying framework.
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Hence, we explore more ambitious options that involve updating the SDN stack
to achieve high-speed sampling that can adapt according to the provider’s need in
real-time.
To this end, we directly modified the Open vSwitch codebase to implement de-
terministic sampling. We built an SDN-based “Sampler” that can deploy sampling
rules on the switches and update the sampling rate as and when needed under the
guidance of the RepMon tenant. The defining characteristic of the Sampler is
that it selects the least “costly” switch in the network to deploy its sampling ru-
les. Currently, we define cost as the number of hops from a switch to its nearest
RepMon instance. Hence, to sample a particular flow, the Sampler tries to iden-
tify the switch, from the entire flow path, which gives the minimum number of
hops and deploys the sampling rule at that switch. This prevents the sampled traf-
fic from traversing needless switches/links and reduces the additional bandwidth
consumed while simultaneously improving latency of detection. Since the Sam-
pler knows the underlying network topology of the data center it can pre-compute
shortest paths between each switch and the RepMon tenant so that finding the
closest switch to RepMon is just a constant time lookup operation. The Sampler
modifies the existing rule such that one copy of the packet is allowed to pass as is
and one copy is sent to RepMon. The following two types of sampling schemes
have been completed for the Sampler:
7.1.1 Probabilistic Sampling
In this scheme, the Sampler selects a particular packet from a flow based on a
probabilistic mechanism. Buckets can be defined by setting a forwarding action
on them and weights are assigned to each bucket amounting to 100. Upon arri-
val, a packet gets placed into one of the buckets probabilistically by generating
a random number and comparing against each bucket’s weight. The higher the
weight the more likely it is that a packet would fall into a particular bucket. For
example, consider two buckets, a forwarding bucket and a drop bucket with weig-
hts 25 and 75 respectively. The random number generated (between 1-100) for
the packet under consideration is 45. Since the number is greater than the weight
of the forwarding bucket this bucket will be skipped. The number will then be
checked against the cumulative weight of the drop bucket and all previously chec-
ked buckets (if more than one), which is 75+25. Since the number falls within




For accurate analysis, RepMon often relies on a particular packet (say every
ith packet) from a flagged flow. Under the current OpenFlow-supported actions,
this is hard to achieve. One suggested way is to delete all rules associated with
a flow that needs to be sampled. Upon packet arrival, the switch will contact the
controller as it has no rules for the packet. The controller can keep count of the
packets and forward chosen packets as needed. This is impractical and wasteful.
Hence, we propose our own scheme to allow for a fast and efficient deterministic
sampling scheme that should be implemented at the lowest level of the SDN stack
(OVS). Our scheme would allow us to define two buckets in the deterministic
case. The first bucket carries out the drop action, while the second bucket has a
forwarding rule installed so that packets that are sent to this bucket can be counted
and forwarded to the relevant output port. The weight of the second bucket is used
to decide which packet to sample. For example, if the weight of the second bucket
is set to 7, every 7th packet of the flow will be forwarded to the RepMon tenant and
all the packets in between will be dropped. To update the sampling speed, only the
weight of the second bucket needs to be updated. This scheme essentially allows
us to deterministically sample every nth packet in a flow.
7.2 COMPONENT 2: BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS SYSTEM
We now present the details of the Behavior Analysis System (BAS). The BAS
is the first component of the RepMon system. It receives sampled traffic from
various flows belonging to a particular tenant deployment and monitors them for
anomalies. The BAS can either use statistical or rule-based detection mechanisms
or even use both. Being a regular tenant, it can simply scale up the monitoring
component giving it more resources and hence allowing it to use a multitude of
schemes. We try both rule-based detectors, such as Snort and Bro, and also work
with statistical classifiers after training them on normal tenant behavior. This
highlights the modular design of RepMon where by different anomaly detectors
can be added and removed in a Plug-and-Play type of design. The choice of which
anomaly detection mechanism to employ is orthogonal to this work hence, we do
not expand upon it any further and leave it to the discretion of the cloud provider.
90
Once the sampled packets arrive at the BAS, it extracts a lot of useful information
from them, such as rate of each flow, no. of outgoing/incoming flows per tenant,
duration of each flow, aggregate traffic volume per tenant, traffic asymmetry, Hurst
exponent etc. and applies the aforementioned anomaly detection procedures to
it. After anomaly detection, some of these metrics are passed on to the Tenant
Reputation System for calculating reputations.
At times the ongoing sampling rate of a tenant is not sufficient to conclusively
flag a pattern as anomalous. Hence, the BAS contacts the Sampler and instructs it
to increase the sampling rate of the corresponding flow rules. The Sampler quickly
updates the sampling rates so that a more fine-grained analysis can be performed.
The increased visibility helps to accurately flag a pattern as anomalous or even
malicious if it matches a known attack pattern.
7.3 TENANT REPUTATION SYSTEM (TRS)
The Tenant Reputation System stores the reputation of the tenants based on their
past and current behavior. Reputation is the running weighted average of a tenant’s
‘good’ behavior and their ‘bad’ behavior quantified by two separate scores (Good
Score and Bad Score). When an anomaly and other metrics are received from the
BAS, the scores are updated for each tenant. If a match occurred in the previous
stage to a known attack pattern, the bad score is increased. However, if a match did
not occur then the scores are adjusted simply based on the features of the anomaly.
If no anomaly was detected in the first step, reputations are still updated based on
other factors, such as bandwidth consumed. The overall reputation of a tenant can
be tailored to “favor” a tenant’s history (past behavior) over his current behavior
or vice versa using weights. Once the tenant reputation has been updated, the
security policies can be modified accordingly. We now present the details of the
TRS in more detail:
7.3.1 Quantifying Good And Bad Behavior
Data center tenants exhibit varying degrees of good and bad behavior. This
presents two main challenges: 1) how to categorize the observed behavior in to a
category and 2) how to quantify this behavior. There are numerous aspects to con-
sider, such as network behavior, honoring financial commitments and fair-usage
policies, age of subscription etc. and it is not entirely clear how to quantify these
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aspects into a mathematical system that can be statistically analyzed. To this end,
we introduce the concept of reputation that is fundamentally characterized by two
scores i.e., the good and the bad score. The Good Score (GS) and Bad Score (BS)
in turn are running weighted sums taken over the entire life cycle of the tenant (in
periodic intervals of 5 minutes or whatever interval the provider chooses) since its
provisioning and constitute numerous metrics given by the following equations
for the nth interval:
GSn = (ω1 ×GScurrent) + (ω2 ×GSn−1)
BSn = (ω1 ×BScurrent) + (ω2 ×BSn−1)
Where ω1 and ω2 are the weights assigned to the scores of the current interval
and the summation of the scores of all of the previous intervals respectively. The
vendor can choose these weights to tune RepMon to pay more emphasis on either
the current behavior or the past behavior (history) of the tenant based on the ven-
dor’s preferences. This makes RepMon a very unique anomaly detection tool as
it can act like other network and host-based monitors if ω2 is set to zero or can
base its decisions in a much more informed way by looking into the history of
the tenants if ω1 and ω2 are adjusted accordingly. The GS and BS for the current
interval are given by the following equations:
GScurrent = ω1(x) + ω2(y) + ω3(z) · · ·+ ωn(n)
BScurrent = ωa(i) + ωb(j) + ωc(k) · · ·+ ωz(u)
Where ω1, ω2 and so on are the weights and x, y and so on are the metrics
that constitute the GS for the current interval. Similarly, for BS ωa, ωb and so on
are the weights and i, j and so on are the metrics that constitute the BS for the
current interval. Weights are assigned based on the significance of a metric to the
cloud provider. For instance, one vendor may penalize a tenant strongly based on
its type of subscription (enterprise vs. free tier) where as the other vendors may
consider this a less meaningful metric. Some of the metrics, which are used for
computing the GS and BS along with a small description of each are mentioned
in Table 7.1.
The reputation score is kept for every tenant and, as obvious from previous
discussion, may or may not change significantly over time according to the beha-
vior of the tenant. The scores allow RepMon to sort each tenant into 4 different
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Metric Explanation GS or BS
Age of subscription Duration since tenant has been active and paying for usage GS
Financial records Check of tenant’s credit ratings, # of missed payments, etc. GS
Subscription type Enterprise, academic, free, trial, internal, etc. Each has a different
effect on the score
GS
Tenant Credential scanning Fuzzy matching of name, service name, associated email, etc. to
check if real or generated automatically
GS
Port & protocol check Match against known bad port and protocol combinations such as
TCP port 334, which is only used by the Backage Trojan
BS
Destination IP and dom-
ain/URL check
Match against known illegal traffic distribution servers, malware
distribution hosts/domains, black-holed DNS hosts, botnet com-
mand and control lists, phishing and spam lists, TOR bridges,
public block lists etc.
BS
Traffic Abnormality Peculiar traffic over unregistered ports or known bad ports, such
as highly asymmetric traffic, port scanning, firewalking etc.
BS
Normal behavior compliance Exhibiting traffic patterns in compliance with the white profile GS
Attack profile match Exhibiting traffic patterns that resemble black profiles BS
Remote user check IP of remote user, location of remote user etc. Different geo-




One or more VMs behaving oddly from the rest of the VM com-
munity
BS
Complaint history # and type of complaints from other tenants or the Internet BS
Table 7.1: Explanation of some of the metrics used in the calculation of a
tenant’s reputation.
bins called the reputation quadrants (discussed below). Policies are applied on the
quadrants so the reputation essentially determines which set of policies will be
applied to a particular tenant.
7.3.2 Tenant Reputation Quadrant
As obvious from the name, a tenant’s reputation can fall into one of four qua-
drants based on the cumulative values of the Good Score and the Bad Score. Fi-
gure 7.1 illustrates this concept of how the reputation spans these quadrants. Each
quadrant attempts to quantify the threat level of a particular tenant. Monitoring of
tenants in higher threat quadrants is performed at more fine-grained levels by in-
structing the Sampler. For instance, a low good and low bad score means that the
tenant either is of dormant nature or enough history of its behavior is not available
yet, meaning that it is a fairly recent tenant perhaps requiring more monitoring.
On the contrary, a tenant with a high good and a high bad score might not be-
have maliciously on the whole but a couple of its VMs show consistent anomaly
driving the bad scores up. In this case, the traffic patterns of the flagged tenant
need to be matched against attack traffic profiles of known attacks occasionally to
















Figure 7.1: The Good Score and Bad Score together creating the Reputation
Quadrant.
to one since a single score cannot capture a scenario where the tenant is simulta-
neously exhibiting good as well as bad behavior. Tenants that have a high good
and low bad score are the ideal ones, which represent little to no threat to the data
center and can do with very low sampling rates. On the contrary, tenants with a
low good score and a high bad score suggest that the their behavior is malicious
and needs to be dealt with immediately in order to prevent any potential attacks
on other tenants or the Internet at large. Our quadrants can also be used by the
cloud orchestration software to create “safety zones” within a data center. Tenants
that consistently maintain bad reputation should be placed in low-trust and high
scrutiny zones that have greater “surveillance” mechanisms in place as opposed
to well-behaved tenants that can be housed in high-trust zones, as a reward for
good behavior, with less monitoring needed. Policies, explained in detail later,
are generated and applied in correspondence with the quadrants.
7.4 IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
We have implemented the complete RepMon system in C#. The system is cur-
rently running in Microsoft Azure, partially in their production environment and
some components in the test environment. Due to availability of VM-level statis-
tics gathered per tenant, Azure is well-suited for a system like RepMon. However,
due to numerous NDA constraints and lack of data in the public sector we cannot
present results for the RepMon system as of this writing.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION
The aim of this body of work is to provide cloud providers a framework that
is appropriate for proactive prevention of abuse in clouds. The mechanisms pre-
sented in this thesis comprise a security toolbox that providers can leverage and
thwart abuse such as cryptomining, malware hosting, cloud-based attacks, co-
vert/side channels etc. The tools developed include a system call monitoring
fabric, a hardware-assisted behavior profiling tool, a community-based analysis
mechanism for flagging anomalies, a deployment-level migration infrastructure, a
tenant reputation system and variety of others to detect abuse before losses stack
up.
In particular, this thesis argues that robust and scalable host-based anomaly de-
tection systems deployed outside of the VM are needed that can scale to cover the
overarching expanse of clouds and provide customized protection to each client.
As a first step, we present a system call-based scheme deployed at the hypervisor
layer. The scheme is highly scalable (it has a negligible per node space and run-
time overhead) and flexible (the vendor can tune various properties of the system
to adjust detection in accordance with the nature of the client workloads). Our
system makes use of common profiling tools easily available in off the shelf hy-
pervisors. The proposed syscall monitoring-based approach uses Cuckoo Filters
to capture normal behavior and generates malware signatures, based on the tempo-
ral correlation between instances of anomalous behavior across machines, which
protect tenant deployments from attacks.
To supplement the syscall scheme, we proposed the design of a hardware-based
profiling scheme that monitors tenants for resource abuse using Hardware Perfor-
mance Counters (HPCs). This adds a hardware dimension to the infrastructure
and augments the syscall mechanism described above giving us two VM-oblivious
mechanism (one in the hardware and one in the hypervisor). Whether the abuse
is local (restricted to one VM) or being conducted in a pool of participating VMs,
our tool can successfully detect and shutdown the illegitimate mining-based abuse
before any substantial losses are incurred.
In order to thwart covert and side channels, which result from host and network-
based abuse of resources, this thesis argues in favor of dynamically repositioning
deployments to minimize the time spent sharing resource between two tenants.
Additionally, we present a set of migration schemes with various desired features
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such as minimizing downtime as opposed to minimizing network congestion.
Finally, all aforementioned schemes can leverage the final piece of the puzzle
i.e., a tenant reputation system that can help determine the granularity of monito-
ring or the destination of the migrating deployment etc. This thesis provides cloud
providers with a framework, built on top of various components each specializing
in mitigating a particular category of cloud abuse. The results herein are promi-
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